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I. INTRODUCTION

A. GeneralDiscussion
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules"') focus, inter alia, on a lawyer's duty to avoid impermissible conflicts of
interest in civil litigation. Rule 1.7 is the general rule.2 Although there are several

reasons for a prohibition on conflicts of interest, the primary one examines how the
lawyer works or operates for his client. It focuses on the lawyer's ability to provide
effective, independent representation, including an appropriate regard for
confidentiality and loyalty, to his client. It is thereby operational.3
1. The American Bar Association adopted its Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908. In 1969, it adopted
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In 1983, it recommended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
It has currently established the Ethics 2000 Advisory Council to study the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
This Article will focus on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; most jurisdictions have adopted them.
2.
Rule 1.7 provides:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client ifthe representation of that client will be directly adverse
to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single
matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997).
3.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct reject the nonoperational rubric, "the avoidance of the
appearance of impropriety," as an effective focus of analysis. Although some commentators have suggested this
appearance test serves important public relations functions and it warns lawyers to lean over backwards to be
ethical, it remains unclear why mere appearances should support important legal ethics violations. First, although
the "appearance of impropriety" may have some relevance with respect to public officers, it offers little of substance
in the private arena. If citizens distrust their public lawyers, then it is plausible they may lose respect for the
governmental and legal system. What the public thinks about lawyers engaged in private law practice does not bear
on the issue of public trust. The ABA's earlier Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9 is entitled: "A
Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety." Its primary focus is on public, not
private, lawyers. The ABA deleted this topical rubric from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Second, the
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This Article focuses on this general conflict of interest rule in the Model Rules
in one fairly common situation: legal representation of one or more corporations,
all of which are separate juristic entities, when these corporations are commonly
owned and affiliated. Those affiliated groups will be referred to as corporate
families. This Article raises the following question: When may a lawyer, who
represents one juristic entity in a corporate family on one matter, simultaneously
represent another client in a lawsuit on an unrelated matter against a different
juristic entity within the same corporate family?' This Article also speculates how
this inquiry applies when the affiliated operating businesses of the family group are
not separate juristic entities, but rather operate as divisions of a single juristic
corporation. This Article refers to this business arrangement as a corporate
conglomerate.
The ABA's Committee on Professional Ethics ("Committee") addressed these
issues in Formal Opinion 93-3725 and in its important and controversial Formal
Opinion 95-390.6 In Formal Opinion 93-372, the Committee unanimously stated,
in passing, that there was a per se breach of legal ethics if a lawyer represents one
client against a corporate conglomerate while simultaneously representing that
corporate conglomerate in an unrelated matter.7 In Formal Opinion 95-390, the

appearance of the wrong does not necessarily imply that the lawyer has actually committed the wrong. It is unfair
to punish a lawyer for doingiothing substantively wrong. Third, it is unclear what the "appearance of impropriety"
means. Its precise meaning is ambiguous and changes from differing perspectives. It offers little guidance to active
professionals, and although it may encourage them to lean in one direction to avoid a negative appearance, this
leaning may itself result in unprofessional conduct A lawyer who unduly avoids a conflict may not serve a client
well. Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder, and so is the nebulous appearance of impropriety.
Of course, not all commentators believe the "appearance of impropriety" is a nebulous rubric. Mr. Lawrence
J. Fox worries that clever lawyers will consistently interpret rules, particularly Rule 1.7(a), in a way that opens the
door to gamesmanship at the expense of true ethics. His suggestion is for persons to interpret the rule so as to avoid
the appearance of impropriety. He writes: "And if this has a chilling effect, reducing the cleverness and glibness
of crusading lawyers cutting down the impediments of conflicts, that,too, is a worthwhile result, one that may lift
the profession out of its present fixation on conflicts as gamesmanship." Lawrence J. Fox, LitigatingConflicts: Is
it 7-me to Revive the Appearance of Impropriety?,PROF. LAW., Feb. 1998, at 1, 10.
4.
This Article uses unrelated matter to refer to legal tasks that do not share information or have
information in common.
5.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372 (1993) [hereinafter Formal
Opinion 93-372].
6.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) [hereinafter Formal
Opinion 95-390].
7.
Formal Opinion 93-372 states:
However, when corporate clients with multiple operating divisions hire tens if not hundreds of law
firms, the idea that, for example, a corporation in Miami retaining the Florida office of a national law
firm to negotiate a lease should preclude that firm's New York office from taking an adverse position
in a totally unrelated commercial dispute against another division of the same corporation strikes some
as placing unreasonable limitations on the opportunities of both clients and lawyers. [However,] the
Model Rules quite correctly treat such a situation as presenting a conflict....
Formal Opinion 93-372, supra note 5.
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Committee took several years to decide there was no per se breach of legal ethics
if a lawyer represents one client against a corporate family member while
simultaneously representing another family member in an unrelated matter. 8 Several
commentators have also addressed these issues. 9
This Article will reduce the complexity of actual situations and cases by
consistently using a simplified hypothetical illustration that builds on what the
Committee, in Formal Opinion 95-390, called the "paradigm situation.'" Parent,
Inc. operates its business through a wholly owned subsidiary, SubsidiaryA, Inc. The
corporate family includes Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc. Parent, Inc. retains
Lawyer to assist it with a tax matter. Client Xretains Lawyer to represent it against
the other corporate family member, SubsidiaryA, Inc., on a complex tort matter that
is unrelated to the tax matter. Client X seeks

8. In Opinion 684, the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional Ethics
concluded that an attorney may bring an action on behalf of one client against a subsidiary of another client. It
decided the issue under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Although it used the "appearance of
impropriety" rubric, it emphasized the problem as the creation of hostility among human persons. Opinion 684 said:
While the appearance of impropriety is difficult to define, as a general rule, the closer the relationship
between the law firm and the subsidiary and the more material an adverse action to the parent, the
greater the chances that the dual representation proposed will appear improper. Where an action would
materially affect the parent, Canon 9 considerations are likely to be implicated if the proposed
representation would require the lawyer to take action hostile to persons connected with the parent,
such as discovery of officers or directors ofthe parent corporation.
Comm. on Professional Ethics, New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, Op. 684 (1991) (emphasis added).
9.
E.g., GEOFFREY C. HAzAm & W. WniLAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d ed. Supp. 1998);
Randall B. Bateman, Return to the Ethics Rules as a Standard for Attorney Disqualfication: Attempting
Consistency in MotionsforDisqualificationby the Use of Chinese Walls, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 249 (1995); Nathan M.
Crystal,Disqualificationof CounselforUnrelatedMatterConflicts ofInterest,4 GEO. J.LEGAL ETHICS 273 (1990);
Lori Gallagher & Andrew S. Hanen, Attorney-Client Conflicts of Inerestand Disqualificationof Counselin Texas
Litigation, 24 TIX. TECH L. REV. 1039 (1993); Bruce A. Green, Conflicts ofInterest in Litigation: The Judicial
Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996); Samara Lackman Kline, Motions to Disqualify Based on Conflicts of
Interest-Identifyingthe Rules of the Game, 25 ST. MARY'S L. J. 739 (1994); Robert P. Lawry, The Meaning of
Loyalty, 19 CAP. U.L. REV. 1089 (1990); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts ofInterest in the Simultaneous Representation
of Multiple Clients: A ProposedSolution to the CurrentConfusion and Controversy, 61 TE. L.REV. 211 (1982);
Thomas D. Morgan, Suing a CurrentClient,9 Gao.. LEoAL ETIcs 1157 (1996); Kenneth L. Penegar, The Loss
ofInnocence: A Brief History of Law Firm Disqualificationin the Courts, 8 Gao. L LEGAL ETHIcs 831 (1995);
Brian L Redding, Suing a CurrentClient:A Response to ProfessorMorgan, 10 GEo. J LEGAL ETHICS 487 (1997);
Lara E. Romansic, Standby Your Client?: Opinion95-390 and Conflicts of Interest in CorporateFamilies, 11 GEO.
L LEGAL ETHIcs 307 (1998); Ronald D. Rotunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate
Families,72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655 (1997); Ted Schneyer, Nostalgiain the Fifth Circuit:Holding the Line on
Litigation Conflicts Through FederalCommon Law, 16 REv. LrNG. 537 (1997); Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U.
Sharpe, Attorney Conflicts of Interest: The Needfor a Coherent Framework,66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1990);
The Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of Interest Issues, 50 BUS. LAW. 1381 (1995); Cregory Zimmer,
Suing a CurrentClient:ResponsibilityandRespectabilityin the Conductof the Legal Profession,II GEO.J. LEGAL
ETHICS 371 (1998); Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interestin the Legal Profession,94 HARV. L. REV.
1244 (1981).
10. Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6.
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substantial money damages [such that] if the suit is successful, this will
affect adversely not only [Subsidiary A, Inc.] but [Parent, Inc.] as well, in
the sense that one of its assets is the equity in the subsidiary, and its
consolidated financial statements may (unless the subsidiary has applicable
insurance coverage) reflect the impact of material adverse judgments
against the subsidiary."
Does Lawyer have an impermissible conflict of interest? Should the answer change
if Parent, Inc. runs its business as a single juristic corporate conglomerate, Parent-A,
Inc, operating through its Division A? In discussing cases and opinions, this Article
will frequently substitute and refer to this simplified, paradigmatic, hypothetical
illustration.
This hypothetical situation is surprisingly common in today's complex business
world.'2 Business acquisitions, law firm expansions, complex litigation strategies,
and law firm conflict-checking systems all contribute to the problem. For example,
Lawyer may represent Parent, Inc. on the tax matter and Client X in a complex tort
lawsuit against Independent A, Inc., an unrelated corporation. Parent, Inc. may
acquire Independent, Inc., making it Subsidiary A, Inc. Lawyer now represents
Client X in a complex tort lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. 3 Or, Lawyer may
represent Parent, Inc. on the tax matter. An unrelated Attorney may represent Client
X in a complex tort lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. Lawyer's law firm may
laterally hire Attorney, who brings her Client X with him. Because the Model Rules
often treat individual members of a law firm as if they were single individuals, the
situation becomes tantamount to Lawyer representing Client X in a complex tort
lawsuit against 4SubsidiaryA, Inc. while simultaneously representing Parent, Inc. on
the tax matter.'
Still another example would be Lawyer representing Parent, Inc. on the tax
matter and Client X in a complex tort lawsuit against Independent, Inc. As
discovery proceeds on Client X's lawsuit, Lawyer determines Subsidiary A, Inc.
must be joined as a defendant. Once this joinder occurs, Lawyer will be

11.
12.

Id.
Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak Co., 820 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Cal. 1993), demonstrates

how far reaching this problem is. The law firm Coudert Brothers represented a division of Eastman Kodak, located
in Hong Kong, in commercial sales of fibers in China. It also brought a lawsuit on behalf of Image Technical
Services concerning sophisticated microphotography equipment against Eastman Kodak in New York. This was
believed to be an impermissible conflict of interest.
13. See, e-g., Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 738 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
14. See MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.10 cmt. [11 (1997) (discussing the meaning of
"firn" for the purposes of imputed disqualification). This Article assumes, for most purposes, that this assumption
holds. No law firm-screening or institutionalized ethics wall will defeat this assumption. This Article focuses
primarily on the fiction associated with the abstract category "client."
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representing Client X in a complex tort lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. while
simultaneously representing Parent, Inc. on the unrelated tax matter. Finally,

Lawyer may represent Parent, Inc. on the tax matter. Client X requests Lawyer to
represent him in a complex tort lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. Lawyer's law
firm checks for conflicts, but it does not discover Parent, Inc. owns Subsidiary A,
Inc. until after Lawyer has filed the Client X v. Subsidiary A, Inc. lawsuit. 15
B. Simultaneous and FormerClient Conflicts
The Model Rules divide conflicts of interest problems associated with multiple
clients into two categories: simultaneous conflicts and former client conflicts. Rule
1.7 examines problems associated with conflicts between simultaneous, current
clients.' 6 Rule 1.9 focuses on conflicts generated between current and former
clients, and its primary concern is assuring the integrity of former client
information. 17 In the hypothetical illustration, Rule 1.9 would be implicated if
Lawyer had been retained by conglomerate Parent-A, Inc. to work on the tax matter,
finished it, and subsequently represents Client X in the complex tort matter against
Parent-A, Inc. Rule 1.9 provides (1) if the complex tort lawsuit is substantially
related (an issue usually resolved by asking if Lawyer had an opportunity to learn
relevant information about the complex tort matter while working for Parent-A,

15. In Harte Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 655 F Supp. 419,420 (S.D. Fla. 1987), for example,
the problem was in the computerized index of client names. The client's name had been misspelled on one of the
firm's list of clients. Id.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997).
17. Rule 1.9 provides:
Rule 1.9 Conflict of Interest: Former Client
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client,
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that
is material to the matter,
unless the former client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has
formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter.
(I) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client
except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the
information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would
permit or require with respect to a client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.9 (1997).
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Inc.) to the unrelated tax matter or (2) if Lawyer had acquired, while Parent-A,
Inc.'s tax lawyer, information relevant to the complex tort matter, then Lawyer
would violate Rule 1.9 if he should represent Client X. 8
As this Article will develop, the Rule 1.7 prohibition against a simultaneous
conflict is automatic if the facts fall within a prescribed bright-line category: "the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client."1 9 This
prohibition is absolute and potentially extensive. Because Rule 1.9 's restrictions
are less severe, lawyers frequently try to convert a current client into a former
client, thereby qualifying for the more permissive Rule 1.9 analysis.
The court in Picker International,Inc. v. VarianAssociates" warned against
this maneuver in certain circumstances. 2 The law firm Jones Day represented
Picker International in a patent lawsuit against Varian. The law firm McDougall,
Hersh & Scott ('"MIH&S") represented Varian on a variety of matters, although not
the patent suit. The two law firms proposed a merger that would result in what they
believed would be an impermissible conflict of interest. The two firms sought
Varian's consent (promising, inter alia, to establish an elaborate screen to assure
that all Varian's confidences would remain secret) to the newly merged Jones Day's
representation of Picker in the patent suit and its continued, simultaneous
representation of Varian on unrelated matters. Varian refused. MH&S, therefore,
withdrew from its representation of Varian and the law firm merger took place.22 In
upholding Varian's motion to disqualify the merged law firm, the trial court stated
the firm could not "drop a client like a hot potato, especially if it is in order to keep
happy a far more lucrative client." 23 To do so would violate its duty of loyalty to
Varian and would inevitably lead to undermining the "public perception of lawyers
and of the administration of justice." 24
This Article assumes Parent, Inc., Parent-A, Inc. (where relevant) and Client X
are all Lawyer's current clients. This Article suggests an interpretive approach to
Rule 1.7(a) that would obviate, in many circumstances, Lawyer's need to convert
a current client into a former client.

18. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Vaporous and the Real in Former-Client Conflicts, 1 J. INST. FOR THE
STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 133 (1996) (discussing the importance of information in former client conflicts).
19. MODELRULES O PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1997).
20. 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1987), aft'd, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
21. Picker, 670 F. Supp. at 1365.
22. Id. In Stratagem Development Corp. v. Heron International N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), the court said:
Epstein Becker may not undertake to represent two potentially adverse clients and then, when the
potential conflict becomes actuality, pick and choose between them. Nor may it seek consent for dual
representation and, when such is not forthcoming, jettison the uncooperative client. ... Under these
circumstances, Epstein Becker has no choice but to withdraw from representing either client in this case.
23. Picker, 670 F. Supp. at 1365.
24. Id. at 1367.
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II. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RuLE 1.7
A. The Rule's Structure
Rule 1.7, the general conflicts of interest rule, has two parts: an operational
section, Rule 1.7(b), and a bright-line categorical section, Rule 1.7(a). 25 Rule 1.7(b)
directly examines the factors that influence how Lawyer, in particular
circumstances, works and operates. Its focus is whether Lawyer will be able to
provide effective independent representation to his client. If it is likely that
Lawyer's representation may be "materially limited" in particular circumstances,
then there is a prima facie violation of Rule 1.7(b) that can only be cured by
obtaining the affected client's consent. 26
Section 1.7(a) is the bright-line categorical section. It does not focus on the
predicted quality of Lawyer's professional work. It describes a situation,
"representation of [one] client directly adverse to another client," 27 and then
concludes if Lawyer's activities fall within this category, there is a prima facie
violation of Rule 1.7(a) that can only be negated by obtaining the consent of both
clients. 28As noted, Lawyer's clients can consent to a prima facie violation of either
section of Rule 1.7. In both cases, however, the Model Rules cautiously establish
preconditions to client consent in order to protect the client from making an
improper choice. This Article later discusses how the preconditions for Rule 1.7(a)
and Rule 1.7(b) are slightly different.
Rule 1.7(a)'s bright-line categorical approach to conflict of interest issues has
been the source of many problems. 29 At the least, it has spawned costly and
unnecessary motions for the disqualification of opposing counsel. 30 Some
commentators have recommended Rule 1.7(a) simply be deleted from the Model

25. See supranote 2.
26. See Rule 1.7(b), supra note 2.
27. Rule 1.7(a), supranote 2.
28. See Rule 1.7(a), supranote 2.
29. In HanfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
the court conceded that there had been a Canon 5 violation (Rule 1.7(a)'s predecessor), but it was reluctant to
disqualify the offending attorney. It said:
that only a wooden application of the ABA canons would support disqualification. In this day of
ftequent firm reorganizations and lateral transfers, such an application would merely invite an increased
number of disqualification motions, born of little more than hardball litigation strategy sessions and
advanced where there is no threat of actual prejudice.
Id at 541.30. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFEmSIONAL CONDuCr RULE 1.7 cmt. [15] (1997) ("Such an objection [to an
opposing counsel's conflict] should be viewed with caution, however, or it can be misused as a technique of
harassment."); see also sources cited supra note 9 (discussing the proliferation of unnecessary motions for
disqualification under Rule 1.7(a)).
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Rules. 31 Other commentators have suggested anyperse connection between a Rule
1.7(a) ethics violation and a motion for disqualification be severed.3 2 While
sympathetic to those approaches, the aim of this Article is more limited. This
Article concedes the continued existence of Rule 1.7(a), but suggests an
instrumental interpretation of its important terms that would effectively limit its
scope and impact to the principal purpose of the conflict of interest rules-the
assurance Lawyer will provide effective, independent client representation with an
appropriate regard for confidentiality and loyalty.3
As has been noted, Formal Opinion 95-39034 held there was no per se violation
of Rule 1.7(a) if Lawyer simultaneously represented Parent, Inc. in the tax matter
and Client X against Subsidiary A, Inc. in the unrelated complex tort lawsuit. There
were vigorous and caustic dissents. Dissenter Lawrence Fox claimed that it would
"destroy traditional notions of client loyalty and client concern." 35 Dissenter
Richard L. Armster worried that it "opens a Pandora's Box of unintended
consequences which most assuredly will return to vex us in the future." 36 Dissenter
Deborah A. Coleman called it "business folly. '37 Even the majority seemed
uncertain with its conclusion. This conclusion suggested a presumption that if there
were any doubts that Rule 1.7(a) applied to a particular case, these doubts "should
be resolved by a presumption that favors the client who will be adversely affected
by the prospective representation. 38
This Article endorses the result of Formal Opinion 95-390 with more
enthusiasm. This Article peeks into Pandora's Box, and explores some surprising
implications in it. What some may find as a strained interpretation of Rule 1.7(a)
to avoid an unduly wooden approach is perhaps the best argument in favor of
simply eliminating Rule 1.7(a) from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
B. Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,Rule 1.7(b)
Before beginning the discussion of Rule 1.7(a), a brief sketch of how Rule
1.73(b) might operate in the hypothetical illustration is appropriate. Regardless of
how commentators interpret Rule 1.7(a), or even if it is eliminated, Rule 1.7(b)

31. See, e.g., Morgan, supranote 9,at 1159 (elaborating the lack of historical record with respect to the
origins of Rule 1.7(a)); Rotunda, supranote 9, at 687 (approving of the result in Formal Opinion 95-390).
32. See, e.g.. Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict ofInterest Doctrine,5 GEo.J.LEGALEThIcs
823 (1992) (arguing that it is unfair to the client to disqualify his offending lawyer).
33. This instrumental interpretation of Rule 1.7(a) will cause it to parallel rule 1.7(b) in its import.
34. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
35. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.

36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id.
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always assures that Lawyer will provide effective, independent legal representation
to each of her clients. This operational section provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representaion will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.39
Rule 1.7(b) directly explores the operational issue of effective representation
as it relates to each client separately. Its first operational factor is client loyalty. As
to each, Parent, Inc. and Client X, if Lawyer's representation "may be materially
limited," there is a prima facie violation of the Rule, and Lawyer shall not continue
to represent the affected client.40 The key operative words, "may be materially
limited," uses the probabilistic "may." It thus serves as an early-warning device,
alerting Lawyer not to continue representation of a particular client if it is unlikely
he will be able to provide that client effective, independent representation in the
future. In Formal Opinion 95-390, the Committee's majority was aware of Rule
1.7(b)'s importance. It said:
What triggers Rule 1.7(b) is a lawyer's recognition of the possibility that
a particular representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilitiesto anotherclient.As the Comment to the Rule makes clear,
the reference is to situations "when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend
or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." Such a material limitation on
the lawyer's ability properly to represent a client could arise, for example,
if the lawyer's concern for remaining in the good graces of client A was
likely to impair the independence of judgment or the zeal that the lawyer
could bring to bear on behalf of client B.41
A second relevant operational factor included in Rule 1.7(b) is the important
principle of client confidentiality. The Model Rules, moreover, emphasize this
39. MoDEL RULES OF PROFESSiONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1997).
40. Id.
41. Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6 (italics added).

McGeorge Law Review / VoL 30
important duty. First, there is the independent duty not to disclose information. Rule
1.6 mandates that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation
of a client, unless the client consents after consultation.42 Second, there is the
specific articulation of this duty as an aspect of the general duty to avoid

impermissible conflicts of interest. In Rule 1.8, entitled "Conflict of Interest:
Prohibited Transactions," subsection (b) insists that a "lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client

unless the client consents after consultation. 43
In the hypothetical illustration, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), Lawyer will have to
decide if his representation of Parent, Inc. on the tax matter may be materially
limited by his representation of Client X in the complex tort lawsuit against

Subsidiary A, Inc. The answer, of course, depends on the facts. Because it is
unlikely Lawyer will acquire information relevant to Client X's lawsuit and because
it is probable Lawyer will be able to effectively and competently complete the tax
matter, there is little likelihood his representation of Parent, Inc. may be materially

limited . With respect to Client X, Lawyer will have to engage in a similar but
separate analysis pursuant to Rule 1.7(b). Will Lawyer's representation of Parent,

Inc. on the tax matter materially limit his representation of Client X against
Subsidiary A, Inc.? If, for example, Parent, Inc. is an important client and promises
future business, Lawyer may conclude that he might be tempted to soft peddle

Client X's lawsuit in order to curry favor with Parent, Inc. After all, from a bottomline perspective, wholly-owned Subsidiary A, Inc.'s loss is also a loss for Parent,
Inc. If these were the facts, Lawyer's representation of Client X may be materially
limited, and his continued representation of Client X would be a prima facie

violation of Rule 1.7(b).

42. Rule 1.6 provides:
Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal change or civil claim against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
43. The full text of Rule 1.8(b) provides: "A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of
a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted or required
by Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3." MoDEL RuLs OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1997).
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In the event of a prima facie ethics violation with respect to either Parent, Inc.
or Client X, each may consent, under prescribed conditions, to Lawyer's continued
representation. As to each client separately, Rule 1.7(b) permits Lawyer to continue
if (1) Lawyer "reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected, '' and (2) if each affected client, either Parent, Inc. or Client X, "consents
after consultation."'45 The first condition is an objective one, because it focuses on
Lawyer's "reasonable" belief. It asks Lawyer to predict the future, that is, to decide
if it is probable that a potential "material limitation" will mature into a situation
where her representation will in fact be adversely affected.46 If this maturation is
probable, Model Rule 1.7(b) cautiously prohibits either affected client from
consenting to Lawyer's representation. If either client were permitted to consent,
the client would likely face a Hobson's choice of waiving the conflict or firing its
lawyer in the future. In the hypothetical illustration, Lawyer may know that
although Parent, Inc. is not a major client at the moment, Parent, Inc. plans to retain
a number of lawyers for an important future project. In this case, Lawyer, after
objectively assessing her own resilience to temptation, may understandably be
tempted to "pull her punches" on behalf of Client X in order to curry favor with
Parent, Inc. In such circumstances, Lawyer may not continue her representation of
Client X.
If, on the other hand, Lawyer concludes the potential material limitation will
probably not mature so as to adversely affect his future effectiveness, then the
affected client can consent to the continued representation. It is less certain that the
impermissible conflict will result. This approach allows Parent, Inc. and Client X,
separately, to choose their own levels of risk with respect to whether Lawyer will
be able to provide effective, independent representation in the future. Client X may
wish to retain Lawyer and take the chance that future developments will not
undermine effective, independent representation. Client X may wish to choose to
deal with these matters if, and when, they occur, and he may be willing to retain a
new lawyer if necessary at some future time.
In sum, Rule 1.7(b) is the primary conflicts of interest rule. It is an operational
rule that focuses on Lawyer's ability to provide each client, separately, effective,
independent representation, with an appropriate regard for the factors of loyalty and
confidentiality. It prohibits Lawyer from representing either Parent, Inc. or Client
X if Lawyer's representation may (i.e., potentially) be "materially limited" by her

44. Rule 1.7(b)(1), supra note 2.
45. Rule 1.7(b)(2), supranote 2.
46. In defining the prima facie violation, Rule 1.7(b) uses the phrase "may be materially limited." Rule
1.7(b)(1), supra note 2. In permitting representation regardless of a prima facie violation, Rule 1.7(b) uses the
phrase "will not be adversely affected." Id. "Will" connotes a stronger probability than "may" that the
representation will be adversely affected.
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representation of the other client. If there is a prima facie violation of Rule 1.7(b),
then Lawyer must cautiously and reasonably determine if the representation of that
particular client will (i.e., highly probably) not be adversely affected. If Lawyer
reasonably concludes the potential problem is not likely to mature, then, and only
then, may each affected client, separately, consent after consultation to Lawyer's
continued representation.
C. Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,Rule 1.7(a)
Rule 1.7(a), the bright-line categorical section of the conflict of interest rule,
provides "A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes
the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client;
and (2) each client consents after consultation."47
1. The Adversarial Veto
Rule 1.7(a) does not focus on Lawyer's effective, independent representation
of Parent, Inc. and Client X, separately. Instead, it describes a situation where
' If
"representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client."48
Lawyer's activities fall within these bright-line categories, then there is a prima
facie violation of Rule 1.7(a). If there is such a violation, then Lawyer may not
continue her representation without the consent of "each client." The Official
Comment to Rule 1.7 suggests "each" means that both clients must consent to the
representation,4 9 and this is the commonly held interpretation. 0 The effect of this
understanding is that one client has a veto over its adversary's counsel, without
regard to the first client's interests or injury. In the hypothetical illustration, if
Subsidiary A, Inc. were Lawyer's client, then Subsidiary A, Inc. could withhold
consent to ClientX' s choice of Lawyer, regardless of Subsidiary A, Inc.'s injury. Or,
if Client X's tort lawsuit were directly adverse to Parent, Inc., or to Parent-A, Inc.,

47. Rule 1.7(a), supra note 2.
48. Id.
49. See MODELRUIES OFPROFESSOmNALCONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [5] (1997) ("When more than one client
is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client.").
50. For example, the Restatement provides:
Lawyer represents Client B in seeking a tax refund. Client A wishes to file suit against Client B in a
contract action unrelated to the tax claim. Lawyer may not represent Client A in the suit against Client B
as long as Lawyer represents Client B in the tax case, unless both clients give informed consent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 209 illus. 3 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)
(italics added).

1998/An InstrumentalInterpretationof Model Rule 1.7(a)
then that client, regardless51of its injury, could also withhold consent to Lawyer's
representation of Client X.
2. A BriefHistory of Rule 1.7(a)
Why the Model Rules include the bright-line categorical Rule 1.7(a) is
unclear.5 2 There is little clue from the "legislative history." The early drafts of the
Model Rules clearly reflect a direct emphasis on the operational function of the
conflicts of interest rules-the lawyer's ability to effectively and independently
serve each client. The 1980 Discussion Draft provided that there is an
impermissible conflict of interest if the lawyer has "responsibilities that may
adversely affect the representation of a client.' 5 3 The 1981 Proposed Final Draft
continued this focus, providing that there is an impermissible conflict of interest
when the lawyer's ability to represent one client "will be adversely affected by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client"' or, with certain exceptions, "might [be]
adversely affected." 55 It was not until 1982 that the Committee, in the Proposed
Model Rules, added this bright-line categorical language. The Committee gave no
reason for the addition, and the ABA House of Delegates adopted this last version
without helpful discussion.
The earlier 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, in its Disciplinary
Rules (DR), also directly focused on the lawyer's ability to effectively represent her
client. In DR 5-105(A) and (B), the question was whether the lawyer's exercise of
independent judgment will be or would likely be adversely affected under the
circumstances of a particular case. 6 Five years later, the ABA amended this rule to
broaden its scope. The amended DR 5-105(A) and (B) defined an impermissible
conflict of interest as one in which the lawyer would be likely to be involved in
representing differing interests.5 7 There was no need to define "differing interests,"

51. The Comment states that "a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept
employment as an advocate against the enterprise or conduct of the suit in an unrelated matter if doing so will not
adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the enterprise and if both clients consent upon consultation." MODEL
RUL. OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7, cmt. [8] (1997).
52. This language was not in the early drafts of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Professor Morgan
has conclusively established the ABA adopted it without any substantive debate. Morgan, supra note 9, at 1180-81.
53. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (Discussion Draft 1980).
54. MODEL RULES OFPROESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Discussion Draft 1981).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (Proposed Model Rules 1981).
56. 94 REPoRm OF THE AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION 767 (1969).
57. 99 REroRis oFTHm AmEJiCAN BAR ASSOCATION 264 (1974). It is a matter of some debate whether the
amendments add anything of substance to the Code. See Lawry, supra note 9, at 1092.
The amended DR 5-105 provides:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except
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for it had been defined in the 1969 Code as multiple representation in which the
lawyer's loyalty to a client would be adversely affected. 8 This language is
consistent with the operational function of ensuring effective, independent client
representation.
Canon 6 of the ABA's still earlier 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics further
suggests that Rule 1.7(a)'s "directly adverse" language is an unexplained latecomer.5 9 Under the Canons, a lawyer has an impermissible conflict of interest if she
"represents conflicting interests." Canon 6 defined "conflicting interests" as those
in which the lawyer would, "in behalf of one client, [have a] duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose. ' '6° In other words, conflicting
interests were situations in which it would be logically impossible for the lawyer
not to have her representation of at least one of her clients effectively impaired.
The Rule 1.7(a) drafters, perhaps, had Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama,Inc.,6t in

mind. Attorney Fleishmann was a partner in the Buffalo Jaeckle firm and the New
York City Webster firm. The Jaeckle firm represented the defendant Cinerama in
an antitrust suit with respect to monopolistic licensing practices. Attorney
Fleishmann's involvement was minimal. While this suit was pending in Buffalo, the
Webster firm "inadvertently and unknowingly [of the Buffalo suit and] with.., no
actual wrongdoing" initiated an anti-takeover suit in New York City against
Cinerama on behalf of Cinema 5 Ltd.62
Cinerama moved to disqualify the Webster firm from representing Cinema 5 in
the New York City litigation. The trial court granted the motion. The trial court had
an operational focus, particularly with respect to the confidentiality issue. It
concluded that because Fleishmann was a partner in both firms and there was a
sufficient relationship between the two controversies, Cinerama's future
confidential communications with the Jaeckle firm would be inhibited. 63

to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).

(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his
representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing interests,
except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1974).
58. 94 REPORTS OFTHE AMERICAN BAR AssocL-TIoN 796 (1969).
59. Canon 6 provides in pertinent part:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client

requires him to oppose.
CANoNs OFPRoFssioNAL ETHics Canon 6 (1908).
60. Id.
61. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).

62. Cinerama,528 F.2d at 1387.
63.

Id. at 1385.
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order of disqualification.6 It,
however, shifted the emphasis to a more categorical approach. The issue was not
whether the Jaeckle firm's representation of Cinerama would be materially limited
and confidentiality jeopardized. The court instead asserted that the issue was one
of "undivided loyalty." 65 Because Fleishmann was a partner in both firms, and
because he therefore owed a duty of undivided loyalty to both Cinerama (in the
Buffalo case) and Cinema 5 (against Cinerama in the New York City case), neither
he nor his partners could represent "two masters."6 At the least, the court claimed,
there was the "appearance of impropriety," and it affirmed the Webster firm's

disqualification. 67

3. The Purposes(?) ofRule 1.7(a)
One possible purpose of Rule 1.7(a) may be prophylactic.6 It might be easier

to interpret the bright-line categories of Rule 1.7(a) than to make the difficult
operational assessments and future predictions required by Rule 1.7(b). Pursuant to

Rule 1.7(b), Lawyer must decide if the representation of Client X may be
"materially limited" to*support a prima facie violation of the Rule. If Lawyer
believes there is a prima facie violation, he then must decide whether he

"reasonably believe[s] the representation will not be adversely affected" before
ClientXmay consent to the representation.6 9 Predictions ofthis sort are complicated

and uncertain, and they are particularly difficult when Lawyer, the person who
might be obligated to forego a client, must make the decision. It would be tempting

for Lawyer, if he wishes to represent Client X in the complex tort lawsuit against
Subsidiary A, Inc., to decide that his representation of Client X would not be

"materially limited."
64. ld
65. Id. at 1386.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1387.
68. In SWS FinancialFundA v. Salomon Brothers,Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1392,1401 (N.D. UI.1992), the court
stated:
Given the costs imposed by disqualification and the theoretical availability of alternative means of
enforcement of the disciplinary code, a court should look to the purposes behind the rule violated in
order to determine if disqualification is a desirable sanction. There are basically two purposes behind
Rule 1.7. First it serves as a prophylactic to protect confidences that a client may have shared with his
or her attorney. In that regard, Rule 1.9 shares the same concern as it prohibits an attorney from
representing a client against a former client if the matter is "substantially related" to the matter(s) of the
former representation. The second purpose behind Rule 1.7 is to safeguard loyalty as a feature of the
lawyer-client relationship. A client should not wake up one morning to discover that his lawyer, whom
he had trusted to protect his legal affairs, has sued him-even if the suit is utterly unrelated to any of
the work the lawyer had ever done for his client.
69. Rule 1.7(b)(l), supranote 2.
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The argument that the categorical Rule 1.7(a) is prophylactic is, however,
unpersuasive. First, its categories, although they appear clear and bright, are no

easier to interpret than Rule 1.7(b)'s focus on "material limitation." Second, Rule
1.7(a)'s language suggests it was not designed as an early warning prophylactic
system. If it were, its language would trigger a response chronologically prior to
Rule 1.7(b). The language of the two sections, however, contradicts this suggestion.
Rule 1.7(b) uses the verb "may" before "materially limited." This suggests that a

mere possibility of material limitation is a prima facie problem. Rule 1.7(a) uses the
verb "will" before its categorical situations, suggesting a higher probability that
Lawyer's activities and the relevant facts will fall within the bright-line categories
of Rule 1.7(a). Because a probability occurs after a possibility, a Rule 1.7(b)

violation will frequently come before a Rule 1.7(a) ethics violation. It is therefore
unlikely the drafters intended Rule 1.7(a) as an early prophylactic warning with
respect to what constitutes an impermissible conflict of interest.
Another possible purpose of the categorical Rule 1.7(a) is that it aptly describes
one clearly impermissible situation.70 The drafters believed a lawyer could not

represent one client in a lawsuit against another client on the same matter. First, in
these situations, the lawyer could not be loyal to each client; aggressive advocacy

for one would, by logical necessity, result in a material limitation on her
representation of the other. Second, in a same matter conflict, the judiciary has a
strong interest in each client having effective, independent representation. Vigorous
advocacy and clear argumentation refine issues and help to present facts. One way
to ensure effective advocacy would be to prohibit a lawyer, under any

circumstances, from representing opposing adversaries in the same case. The
District of Columbia clearly takes this position.7 1 The Restatement also takes this

view, noting clients may not consent to a single lawyer representing adversarial
sides in the same litigation.72 Another, perhaps less effective, way to protect the

70. Some commentators have suggested that Rule 1.7(a) defines those cases in which there is the
"appearance of impropriety," and that lawyers should always avoid these "appearance of impropriety situations."
The argument is not that Rule 1.7(a) serves the main purposes of conflicts of interest rules or a prophylactic
function, but rather that, in and of itself, the "appearance of impropriety" should be avoided. Lawrence J.Fox,
Litigating Conflicts: Is it Time to Revive the Appearance of Impropriety?, PROF. L., Feb. 1998, at 1,
9.
71. District of Columbia, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) clearly provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent a client with respect to a position to be taken in a matter if that position is adverse to a position taken or
to be taken in the same matter by another client represented with respect to that position by the same lawyer." D.C.
CODE ANN. Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rule 1.7 (1996). In such a circumstance, there should be no opportunity
for client consent. The Comment articulates the rationale: "Institutional interests in preserving confidence in the
adversary process and in the administration ofjustice preclude permitting a lawyer to represent adverse positions
in the same matter." Id.; see Eric L. Hirschhorn, Dealing with Lawyer Conflicts: New D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct Take aMore RealisticApproach,LEGA.LT1as, Nov. 18,1996, at 22 (describing the D.C. Rules as being
more congruent with modem business reality).
72. RESTATEMENT FHnmD) OF THE LAw GovrmNlG LAWYERs § 202(2)(b) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,

1996).
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judiciary's interests in strong advocacy would be to give each client a veto over his
adversary's lawyer. This power, certain to be used for strategic ends, will
effectively protect the judiciary from ineffective advocacy. This factor perhaps
explains why, if Client Xretains Lawyer to bring a lawsuit against Parent, Inc., and
Lawyer was simultaneously retained by Parent, Inc. to represent it against Client X
on the same matter, each client should have a veto over the other's use of Lawyer.
This purpose for codifying Rule 1.7(a) is, also, unpersuasive. It is poor drafting
to focus on one situation without an acute awareness of what other cases will be
covered by the Rule's language.7 3 The last minute adoption of Rule 1.7(a) and the
lack of any serious discussion of it presents, however, the possibility that the
drafters had in mind only one case when the ABA originally adopted Rule 1.7(a).
They did not give the language much thought. This possibility, however, does not
explain the near universal acceptance of Rule 1.7(a) after its adoption. Finally, the
Official Comment to Rule 1.7(a) suggests the rule is broader. The Comment notes
that ordinarily a lawyer cannot represent one client against another client, even if
the second matter is unrelated, and in the rare cases in which such multiple
representation would be allowed, only if both clients consent.7 4
4. The Disqualificationof Opposing Counsel
It should be no surprise that Rule 1.7(a), with its bright-line categorical
language and its uncertain purposes, has been the source of countless
disqualification motions in which one party withholds consent to an adversary's
choice of counsel, and then moves to disqualify the lawyer. It has become an
important weapon in a litigator's arsenal. There are legitimate purposes behind a
disqualification order. It may be, for example, the only way to assure client
confidences will not be misused and that lawyers are appropriately loyal to their
clients.
There are, however, a number of problems with these motions. Too often
lawyers use the motion to disqualify opposing counsel as a strategic weapon. If an
adversary's lawyer can be disqualified, it will clearly be more difficult and
expensive for the opponent to continue the lawsuit. This is particularly true when
the disqualification order occurs in the midst of litigation. The disqualification order

73. One commentator notes the problem is caused by unduly broad rules that in turn lead to undesirable
results. They do not adequately balance the competing interests of clients and the practicing bar. This "failure
results in a wooden framework that disserves everyone." Marc I. Steinberg & Timothy U. Sharpe, Attorney
Conflicts of Interest: The Need for a Coherent Framework, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
74. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcT RULE 1.7 cmt. [3] (1997). The Restatement, particularly
illustration 3 to section 209(2), notes a lawyer should not represent one client against another, even if the second
matter is unrelated to the first. RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 209(2) illus. 3
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol 30
may also cause delay. This too, can raise opponent's litigation costs. Finally, the

disqualification order can result in costly and time-consuming peripheral litigation
for all. 5
The costs of such satellite litigation can easily outweigh its benefits. The Model
Rules' drafters were aware of this, and the Official Comment to Rule 1.7 warns

lawyers that it is unprofessional to initiate such motions merely for strategic
advantage. 76 The U.S. Supreme Court has also effectively limited the interlocutory
appeals of these motions, signaling its mistrust of the motions misuse.

As one would expect, with such confusion and high strategic stakes, there has
evolved a substantial jurisprudence with respect to these motions. Courts have been

of two minds about the proper relationship between an ethics violation and the
disqualification motion.78 Most courts begin by asking if there has been a violation

of the ethics rules. If there has been a violation, courts take one of two approaches
to the disqualification motions. Some courts find a per se connection between the
ethics violation and the disqualification order. Others take a more sensible and

moderate approach. It is necessary, they argue, that there must be an ethics
violation, but such a violation is not sufficient by itself to support a disqualification

order. They apply a practical rule of reason, taking the ethics violation into account
in intelligently deciding whether to disqualify opposing counsel. Among other

reasons for this practical position, some courts, as well as commentators, have noted
that a disqualification order is a disproportionate and misdirected penalty for a Rule

75. Professor Crystal argues that there are four reasons for disqualification: to prevent a taint in the pending
trial; to promote public confidence in lawyers and the legal system; to punish ethical misconduct; and to deter future
impropriety. He argues that only the first justifies disqualification; the other three purposes are better served in other
procedures. Crystal, supranote 9, at 286.
76. The Comment provides "Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient
administration ofjustice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed
with caution, however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDuCr Rule 1.7 cmt. [15] (1997).
77. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 370 (1981) (holding that there usually could
be no interlocutory appeal of the trial judge's ruling with respect to a disqualification motion).
78. Professor Crystal, in an excellent article, suggests courts have taken two approaches to the problem of
disqualification. One line of cases allows disqualification if the lawyer's loyalty is called into question or there is
the possibility of the appearance of impropriety. The second line of cases calls for a balancing test of costs and
benefits. Crystal, supranote 9.
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1.7(a) breach.79 Not only is it costly and expensive, but a disqualification order also
directly penalizes the client, not the wrongdoing lawyer.
In light of the complexity, it is easy to distrust judicial interpretations of Rule
1.7(a). Judges may too casually address the ethics issue when their principal focus
is the disqualification motion. A per se linkage between an ethics violation and a
disproportionate and misdirected disqualification order may dispose the judge to
avoid finding .an ethics violation in the first instance. Other judges, who are
comfortable with treating the ethics violation separately from the disqualification
motion, may be unduly censurious in finding an ethics violation. In the actual
application of their disqualification jurisprudence, they can minimize the
importance of their own finding of an ethics violation by denying the
disqualification motion. One striking bit of evidence that judges rarely treat Rule
1.7(a) violations as a serious ethics matter is that there is almost no evidence these
judges report the "offending lawyer" to the disciplinary authorities after dealing
with a disqualification motion.80
This Article focuses on the ethics issue without regard to its use in a
disqualification motion. There is no emphasis on either the necessary or unjust
consequences of a violation of Rule 1.7(a) in the context of a motion to disqualify.
To emphasize these consequences would distort the analysis. It has, moreover, been

79.

In SWS FinancialFundA v. Salomon Brothers,Inc., 790 F Supp. 1392, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1992), the court

said:
Disqualification, by contrast, is a blunt device. The sanction of disqualification foists substantial costs
upon innocent third parties. The innocent client (Hickey in this case) may suffer delay, inconvenience
and expense and will be deprived of its choice of counsel. When disqualification is granted, sometimes
the new attorney may find it difficult to master fully the subtle legal and factual nuances of a complex
case (like this one), actually impairing the adversarial process. Of course, the court may also lose the
time and labor invested in educating itself in the proceedings prior to disqualification. It is no secret that
motions to disqualify are frequently brought as dilatory tactics intended to "divert[ ] the litigation from
attention to the merits."(citation omitted).
80. In Salomon Bros., the court found a serious ethics violation, but did nothing to follow up on it:
The foregoing discussion should not be misunderstood to mean that this court does not take very
seriously a lawyer's ethical responsibilities to avoid conflicts of interest. Schiff should not have agreed
to bring this suit against Salomon Brothers. Rule 1.7 prohibited it from doing so. The court, however,
does not believe that the costly sanction of disqualification should be automatic for a breach of even so
serious an obligation as that imposed by Rule 1.7. There is no danger in this case that Schiff's advocacy
of Hickey will be less than fully zealous, the trial would not be tainted by Schiff's continued
representation of Hickey, the subject of this litigation is not substantially related to the work Schiff has
done for Salomon, and disqualification would simply not be the appropriate remedy. The court's final
concern is whether Schiff would fail adequately to carry out its commodities futures projects for
Salomon Brothers. Salomon has not mentioned that this might be a possibility and the court sees no
reason to fear that this might be a problem.
Salomon Bros., 790 . Supp. at 1403.
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done elsewhere.81 This Article takes seriously the idea lawyers will want to comply

with the Model Rules. First, lawyers aspire to the highest professional standards.
It is therefore necessary for them to know what these standards require. Second, the

principal purpose of the conflict of interest rules is to assure effective, independent
client representation, with a due regard for confidentiality and loyalty. It is

imperative that lawyers should seek to provide this level of service in all contexts.
Third, although the jurisprudence surrounding the disqualification motion is the
most common venue for an analysis of the issues, there is always the chance that

a lawyer may be disciplined for a violation.' Fourth, and not least important,
conflicts of interest analysis involving juristic entities is a particularly murky and
difficult area of law. A limited and focused analysis may bring clarity to these
issues. 3
5. One Implication in Pandora'sBox
Some commentators have recommended that Rule 1.7(a) simply be deleted
from the Model Rules. 84 Other commentators have suggested anyperse connection
between a Rule 1.7(a) ethics violations and a motion for disqualification be
severed.85 Although sympathetic with both those approaches, the aim of this Article

81. See, e.g., Bateman, supra note 9; Crystal, supra note 9; Green, supra note 9; David Hricik, Uncertainty,
Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and LargeFinn Practicein Texas, 16 REV. LITIG. 705 (1997); Lawry, supra note
9; McMunigal, supra note 32; Moore, supra note 9; Morgan, supra note 9; Penegar, supra note 9; Redding,
supra note 9; Rotunda, supranote 9; Michael Sacksteder, FormalOpinion95-390 ofthe ABA's Ethics Committee:
CorporateClients, Conflicts of interest, and Keeping the Lid on Pandora'sBox, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 741 (1997);
Steinberg & Sharpe, supra note 9; Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
supranote 9.
82. Professor Crystal notes that a court will have broad discretion in forcing a lawyer to disgorge fees, or
to prohibit a client from paying a fee, in cases of impermissible lawyer conduct. He believes the courts can best
calibrate the punishment to fit the blameworthiness of the lawyer's act. Crystal, supranote 9, at 312.
83. If a lawyer violates Rule 1.7(a), he might also lose a fee or be subjected to a malpractice action.
84. E.g., Morgan, supra note 9.
85. See McMunigal, supranote 32.
Texas, for example, has dramatically changed Rule 1.7(a). It uses operational criteria. Texas Disciplinary Rule
1.06(a) through (c) provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent opposing parties to the same litigation.
(b) In other situations and except to the extent permitted by paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not
represent a person if the representation of that person:
(1) involves a substantially related matter in which the person's interests are materially and
directly adverse to the interests of another client of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm; or
(2) reasonably appears to be or become adversely limited by the lawyer's or law firm's
responsibilities to another client....
(c) A lawyer may represent a client in the circumstances described in (b) if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation of each client will not be materially
affected; and
(2) each affected or potentially affected client consents to such representation after full
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is more limited. This Article concedes the continued existence of Rule 1.7(a), but
suggests an instrumental interpretation of its important categories that will

effectively narrow its scope and impact to the principal purpose of the conflict of
interest rules. This Article thus enthusiastically endorses the result of Committee's
Formal Opinion 95-390 and follows the logic of its opinion. This Article peeks into

Pandora's Box, and explores some of the surprising implications in it.
An examination of Fox's dissent to Formal Opinion 95-390 illustrates what
these surprising implications might be. His logic is sound; his first premise,
however, is not as certain as he believes. Fox begins by stating the purpose of

corporate groups is the "maximization of economic success. '86 He then notes a
business may operate through subsidiaries or divisions. There will be a number of
reasons for these choices. "They will almost never reflect a client judgment that
what happens to the subsidiary, parent or sibling is not a matter that it cares about
very much indeed.

87

To this point, Fox's observations are correct. He then states his first premise:
All members of this Committee agree that a lawyer may never take a
position directly adverse to a client corporation no matter how minor the

matter and no matter how distant geographically, by industry or by
personnel, the new proposed representation is from the original one the

disclosure of the existence, nature, implications, and possible adverse consequences of the
common representation and the advantages involved, if any.
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 9 Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.06 (West 1998).
The Texas rule thus examines whether the lawyer represents the adversaries on "a substantially related
matter," thereby focusing on the issue of confidentiality, or "adversely limited by the lawyer's... responsibilities
to another client," thus focusing on effective representation.
Unfortunately, not all courts with the opportunity to adopt the proposed rule have done so. In Red Eagle
Resources Corp. v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 1992 WL 170614 (S.D. Tex.), the Susman Godfrey firm represented
Dresser in two matters. During the pendency of these suits, the Susman Godfrey firm initiated, on behalf of Red
Eagle Resources, an antitrust lawsuit against Dresser. The trial court refused to disqualify the Susman Godfrey law
firm. It noted that the governing rule was the Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 1.06(b). Rule
1.06(a) was not discussed because the law firm did not represent opposing parties in the same litigation. Rule
1.06(b)(1) was not relevant because the trial court concluded that the two matters were not substantially related,
Finally, Rule 1.06(b)(2) was inapplicable because Susman Godfrey's representation of Dresser would not be
materially affected by Susman Godfrey's representation of Red Eagle in the antitrust lawsuit.
In In re DresserIndustries,Inc., 972 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused tO
follow the Texas district court. Instead, it insisted on crafting a national ethics standard, and it borrowed heavily
from the Model Rules and the Restatement. It emphasized the "appearance of impropriety," and it concluded that
it was per se impermissible for a lawyer to represent one client against another client, even if the second
representation was on an unrelated matter. Id. at 544-45.
See Kline, supranote 9 (explaining the complexities in the American federal system), Gallagher & Hanen,
supranote 9 (exploring the federal court's reluctance to adopt the state's standard).
86. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
87. d
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lawyer is handling. Not only is that the rule, but that is what the rule should
be.88
It now follows, for Fox, that if it is true "a lawyer may never take a position directly
adverse to a client corporation no matter how minor the matter and no matter how
distant geographically, by industry or by personnel,"8 9 it should be equally true a
lawyer may never take a position directly adverse to a corporation's subsidiary. The
corporation is still hurt economically. Whether the corporation operates its business
through subsidiaries or divisions is not a relevant consideration. To hold otherwise,
Fox maintains, is to elevate "form over substance." 9
Is it possible Fox is correct in that how a corporation operates its business is not
a relevant consideration, but that his first premise-that "a lawyer may never take
a position directly adverse to a client corporation no matter how minor the matter
and no matter how distant geographically, by industry or by personnel, the new
proposed representation is from the original one the lawyer is handling," 9 1-is
flawed in that it begs the question of who is the "client" and what is entailed by
"directly adverse"? If we combine Fox's insight that whether a business operates
through subsidiaries or divisions is irrelevant with the Committee's conclusion that
there is no per se prohibition on Lawyer representing Client X against Subsidiary
A, Inc. in a complex tort matter, while simultaneously representing Parent, Inc. on
an unrelated tax matter, then, perhaps, there ought not to be aperse prohibition on
Lawyer representing ClientXin a complex tort lawsuit against Parent-A, Inc. (when
the thrust of Client X's lawsuit engages Division A), while simultaneously
representing Parent-A, Inc. on an unrelated tax matter. At the least, Lawyer may not
violate Rule 1.7(a) in certain situations, including those in which Parent-A, Inc. has
prospectively consented to Lawyer's actions with respect to future lawsuits against
it or in which Lawyer is not responsible for triggering the bright-line categories of
Rule 1.7(a).
As noted above, such conclusions will be surprising to some. Dissenter Fox
claimed it would "destroy traditional notions of client loyalty and client concem." 92
This Article contends that the Committee's Formal Opinion 95-390 will not only
fail to destroy traditional notions, but also its analysis is essential to make legal
ethics relevant to the complicated world of business and law practice. The Model
Rules are premised, in good part, on the assumption that clients and lawyers are
single individuals. In such circumstances, the conflicts of interest rules work well.

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

92.

Id
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They do not work well when either client or lawyer is a complicated business
enterprise. The wooden application of an abstraction, a client, to a fiction, a
corporation, a corporate conglomerate, or a corporate family, can only lead to
absurd and inefficient results. The Committee was on the right track when it
carefully alluded to the operational significance of Rule 1.7(a). It consistently
refused to treat the abstraction, the client, in a one size fits all manner. It noted, for
example, a corporation could be a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a), but not a "fullfledged" client.93 This instinct to deconstitute the abstract category for different
purposes and different situations makes instrumental sense. This Article's analysis
purports to extend this instrumental focus, always noting that the issue is whether
Subsidiary A, Inc. or Parent-A, Inc. (where relevant) is Lawyer's client for the
particularpurposes of Rule 1.7(a). This will sometimes be referred to as a Rule
1.7(a) client.
II. AN INSTRUMENTAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 1.7(A)
This Article discusses a method of analyzing the following questions germane
to Rule 1.7(a) in the context of the corporate family and corporate conglomerate
complexities. Who is the "client?" When is an action by one client "directly adverse
to another client?" May a client prospectively "consent after consultation" to a
prima facie violation of Rule 1.7(a)? Opinion 95-390 addressed the first two issues.
Because the purposes of Rule 1.7(a) are so ambiguous, this Article suggests that
lawyers interpret Rule 1.7(a) to advance the operational purposes of the conflicts
of interest rule. The operational focus of Rule 1.7(b) should trump the bright-line
categorical approach of Rule 1.7(a) to assure effective, independent client
representation, with an appropriate regard for confidentiality and loyalty. This
Article endorses, in good part, the salutary analysis of Opinion 95-390. When
necessary, this Article supplements the Committee's conclusions, arguing that the
Committee's rationale implies that the ethics rules should encourage a permissive
approach to prospective waivers of conflicts of interest by corporate conglomerates,
particularly those represented by in-house counsel. 94 As noted, this Article further
suggests that a lawyer may represent one client against another client, even without
the second client's consent. In the hypothetical illustration, Lawyer may be able to
represent Client X in the complex tort litigation against Parent-A, Inc. (when the
thrust of Client X's lawsuit engages Division A), while simultaneously representing
the corporate conglomerate, Parent-A, Inc. in an unrelated tax matter.

93. MS
94. If Parent, Inc. is represented by in-house counsel, it is likely it will have competent advice with respect
to consenting prospectively to future, otherwise, impermissible conflicts of interest.
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A. Outline of InstrumentalInterpretation
The first step will be to define client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). This is
problematic because it is difficult in that the abstraction, the category "client," is
imposed on a fiction, the corporation or corporate family. Real human persons are
subsumed in these categories and fictions. What or who is a Rule 1.7(a) client is
hardly self-evident. The problem is not, however, intractable once it is remembered
that we are constituting one or more juristic entities as "clients" for the limited
purposes of interpreting Rule 1.7(a). Thus, Lawyer may be prohibited from
representing Client X in a lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc., but Lawyer will not
necessarily have a professional duty to work for Subsidiary A, Inc.
Once we have determined who the Rule 1.7(a) client is, we can safely claim that
(1) the client's lawyer must be loyal to it, and (2) the lawyer must not reveal or
misuse information relating to her representation of that client. We might pose the
problem in reverse, in an instrumental way. The lawyer's client is that abstraction
to whom the lawyer must be loyal and to whom he owes the duty to keep
confidences. In a nutshell, a lawyer owes his clients certain duties; an entity to
whom a lawyer owes these duties is his Rule 1.7(a) client.
A plausible initial default position in the hypothetical illustration is that only
Parent, Inc. is the Lawyer's client. Once this initial position is granted, it should be
possible for persons to adjust or to reconstitute who is the Rule 1.7(a) client. First,
Parent, Inc. and Lawyer can explicitly or implicitly agree, at the outset of their
relationship, to constitute Subsidiary A, Inc., in addition to Parent, Inc., as Lawyer' s
client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). The effect of this agreement will be to preclude
Lawyer from representing Client X against Subsidiary A, Inc. in the complex tort
lawsuit without Subsidiary A, Inc.'s consent.
Second, due to the inherent ambiguities in the situation and due to the extreme
importance of keeping quasi-client's confidences, if Lawyer, while working for
Parent, Inc., acquires information relevant to the complex tort matter, then
Subsidiary A, Inc. will be constituted Lawyer's client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a).
Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc., however, can, if they do so carefully and
explicitly, negate this conclusion. They can agree with Lawyer the acquisition of
this information will not constitute Subsidiary A, Inc. a client for purposes of Rule
1.7(a). This explicit understanding would thereby entitle Lawyer to represent Client
X against Subsidiary A, Inc. regardless of the fact Lawyer acquired information
relevant to the complex tort matter while working for Parent, Inc. on the unrelated
tax matter.
Finally, if Subsidiary A, Inc. is Parent, Inc.'s alter ego, then Subsidiary A, Inc.
will be constituted a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). What does it mean to be an
alter ego? This Article suggests for the purposes of Rule 1.7(a), Subsidiary A, Inc.
will be Parent, Inc.'s alter ego if the same persons who are in fact responsible for
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representing Subsidiary A, Inc. on the complex tort matter also personally work
with Lawyer on Parent, Inc.'s unrelated tax matter. This Article reaches this result
by focusing on the meaning of loyalty, and how it relates to effective, independent
representation.
The initial default position posits Parent, Inc. as Lawyer's only client; Lawyer
therefore owes it the duty of effective, independent representation. If Parent, Inc.
employees who personally work with Lawyer on the tax matter are personally
unable to trust him, there is likely to be disharmony in the work group. In these
circumstances, it is unlikely Lawyer will be able to effectively and professionally
do her tax work. The employees who are most likely not to trust Lawyer are those
who believe Lawyer is representing ClientXagainst "them." Those employees who
are most likely to feel this betrayal are those who are personally responsible for
managing the Subsidiary A,Inc. defense in Client X's complex tort lawsuit against
it. The claim "my own lawyer" is suing me is a plausible feeling under these
circumstances. If this is the case, Subsidiary A, Inc. is Parent, Inc.'s alter ego. As
such, it will be constituted a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a), and Lawyer, without
Subsidiary A, Ind.'s consent, will be precluded from representing Client X against
it.
B. The InitialDefault Position

Corporate law doctrine posits Parent, Inc. as a separate juristic entity.95 Only the
juristic entity, Parent, Inc. has retained Lawyer. This is a rational starting point, or
initial default position, for Rule 1.7(a) analysis. The singular noun "client" in Rule
1.7(a) connotes a human or a single fictional entity. Thus, a stylistic argument
favors the default position. This default position is consistent with analogous
problems in other areas of law that deal with corporate families. One common
question, for example, is whether Parent, Inc. will be liable for the torts of
Subsidiary A, Inc. In most cases, the answer 96is no. The law does not pierce the
corporate veil without some justifying reason.
There are at least three good reasons for adopting this initial default position in
the conflicts of interest area. First, it simplifies the law to have common
understandings among different doctrinal areas. Although we must always be wary
95. If there is a single conglomerate, Parent-A, Inc., that operates through its Division A,then Parent-A, Inc.
would be a separate juristic entity.
"There is no denying that the entity theory assigns great weight to what is only a legal fiction. An entity does
not actually exist at all apart from its constituent members, and hence cannot claim the personal allegiance of a
lawyer." HAZARD & HODES, supranote 9, at 394.
96. Ronald D. Rotunda, ConflictsProblems When Representing Members ofa CorporateFamily,72 NOTRE
DAMEL. REv. 655,670 (1997) ("In short, for every purpose (except, apparently for purposes of the law of conflicts)
the law treats parents, subsidiaries, and sister corporations as separate and distinct legal entities.").
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of unduly borrowing definitions and approaches from other areas, it is common
sense to do it when no harm is caused. Second, because most areas of law posit
juristic entities as distinct, there is, at least, the inference Parent, Inc. and Lawyer,
at the time of the initial retainer agreement with respect to the tax matter, agreed to
this understanding. Third, the Model Rules adopt this assumption of separate
juristic entitites. Rule 1.13 focuses on the entity client, and it clearly articulates the
distinctiveness of the fictional, juristic entity.
This initial default position, however, does not end the matter. Does Lawyer
represent two clients, Subsidiary A, Inc. as well as Parent, Inc.? Some of the
Committee's arguments for separate entity status are question-begging, and they
indicate the Committee's initial default position is only a starting point. The
Committee was aware that the Model Rules' text did not definitively resolve the
issue. As the Committee suggests, a resolution of who is Lawyer's client will not
be resolved by "any clearcut per se rule but rather upon the particular
circumstances." 98
The Committee's best (although certainly not conclusive) textual argument
supporting the initial default position that Parent, Inc. is Lawyer's only client is its
cross-reference to Rule 1.13's comment, entitled "The Entity as a Client," and Rule
1.13's distinction between an entity and its constituent members, such as its
"officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents." 99 The
Committee seized on the reference to shareholders and concluded that because
shareholders-including parent corporations in a corporate family-were mere
constituents, they were not part of the "organization."" ° Neither the entire corporate
family nor any member of the family was ipso facto the lawyer's organizational
client. °1'
The Committee was not confident of this analysis. It conceded that "the thrust
of the Rule is to require the lawyer to distinguish between the corporation or other
organization, which is his client, and the human representativesof the corporation,
' 2 The
with whom the lawyer works and often forms personal relationships."
Official Comment to Rule 1.13 supports this latter distinction by noting that other
constituents means the positions equivalent to "officers, directors, employees and
shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not

97.

MODELRULES OPPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1997).

98. Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6.
99. MODELRULES OFPROFESSiONALCONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. [1] (1997).
100. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
101. California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct was more
emphatic. It stated: "A parent corporation, even one which owns 100 percent of the stock of a subsidiary, is still,

for purposes of rule 3-600, a shareholder and constituent of the corporation." California State Bar Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113 (1989).
102. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6 (emphasis added).

1998/An InstrumentalInterpretationof Model Rule 1.7(a)
corporations."" °3 The primary distinction in Rule 1.13 is between the fictitious entity
and its human participants, not between legal entities that might constitute the
was
corporate family. It would have been equally logical to find the organization
14
the entire corporate family, exclusive of its human agents and shareholders.t
In the hypothetical illustration, we begin with Parent, Inc. as Lawyer's only
client. This is a plausible initial default position because it is consistent with other
areas of law and it can be assumed that Parent, Inc. and Lawyer agreed to it. The
Model Rules' text also points in this direction. This Article now examines how
Parent, Inc. and Lawyer can change this initial default position by explicit or

implicit agreement ab initio; how an appropriate regard for confidentiality can
modify it; and how an alter ego analysis with its tie between effective client
representation and an appropriate concept of loyalty, can also constitute Subsidiary
A, Inc. as Lawyer's client.
C. Agreement ConstitutingClient
The client-lawyer relationship is not defined in the Model Rules, and for
purposes of any ethics analysis, resort must be made to more general law. The
relationship is essentially a consensual one."0 5 The law maximizes the client's

103. MODELRUIES oFPRoFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 1.13 cmt. [1] (1997) (emphasis added).
104. The Committee also analyzed the Official Comment to Rule 1.7, It stated:
Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter,
even if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may
act as advocate against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse
operationsmay accept employment as an advocateagainstthe enterprisein an unrelatedmatterifdoing
so will not adverselyaffect the lawyer's relationshipwith the enterprise[or conduct of the suit] and if
both clients consent upon consultation.
Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6.
The Committee observed this language, especially the emphasized language, tracked and referred to Rule
1.7(a). Thus, it was clear a lawyer might represent, albeit with both clients' consent, an "enterprise with diverse
operations."Id. This conclusion implied that such an enterprise could be a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). Could
the corporate family of Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc. be considered such an enterprise, and, consequently, a
client? The Committee answered by noting "the use of 'enterprise' in this connection does not refer to [such] a
corporate [family]." Id. The Committee stated "the term is used in the Model Rules [of Professional Conduct], in
distinction from 'corporation' and 'organization,' to denote profit-making entities, which may include not only
corporations but also partnerships, joint ventures and the like." Id.
This is not a strong argument with respect to the issue here. Even if it were true that 'enterprise' denotes a
profit-making entity, it does not suggest, as the first part of the Committee's sentence implies, that 'enterprise' does
not include a corporate conglomerate or a corporate family as one of many types of profit-making entities.
Corporate conglomerate, corporate family, partnership and joint venture could all be enterprises, and each could
be a client for Rule 1.7(a) purposes.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNNG LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996)

states:
[A] lawyer's client is ordinarily the person or entity that consents to the formation of the client-lawyer
relationship, see s. 26. For example, when a lawyer is retained by Corporation A, Corporation A is
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ability to choose its lawyer and it protects the lawyer from having a professional
obligation thrust upon him. The law also allows lawyer and client to define the
scope of the relationship. They can, within certain limits, agree to a reasonable
feet06 and to limited objectives. 07
This is a broad endorsement of client and lawyer autonomy and freedom to
contract. If a client can define so much about the relationship, it follows that in
ambiguous situations, the client (with Lawyer's agreement) should be able to
constitute itself for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). This agreement between Parent, Inc.
and Lawyer might constitute Subsidiary A, Inc. as Lawyer's client for the purposes
of Rule 1.7(a). Such a broad retainer agreement and Rule 1.7(a) would preclude
Lawyer from representing Client X in the complex tort litigation against Subsidiary
A, Inc. without Parent, Inc. or Subsidiary A, Inc.'s informed consent. This retainer
agreement both restricts Lawyer's opportunity to represent Client X in the future
and it assures Parent, Inc. of appropriate (as Parent, Inc. sees it) professional
loyalty.
On the one hand, as a restriction, Parent, Inc. has paid lawyer not to represent
certain persons against an affiliated corporation in the future. This is a restriction
on the Lawyer's right to practice, and although Rule 5.6(a) only explicitly prohibits
these restrictive arrangements after termination of the lawyer-client relationship, 08
they are equally troublesome during the relationship. It would be improper for
Parent, Inc. to pay Lawyer not to represent Client X in a lawsuit against
Independent, Inc. Parent, Inc. would have no interests to protect, and Lawyer and
Client X's important freedom to establish a professional relationship in the future
would be restricted. On the other hand, as an assurance of even an idiosyncratic
view of professional loyalty, Parent, Inc. has a significant interest in restricting
Lawyer's future opportunities. Parent, Inc.'s interests may be substantial, such as
a fear Lawyer will use information to its ultimate, albeit indirect, injury when
Lawyer represents Client X in the lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc., or it may
simply not like the idea of Lawyer representing Client X against what it perceives

ordinarily the lawyer's client; neither individual officers of Corporation A nor other corporations in
which Corporation A has an ownership interest, . . or in which a major shareholder in Corporation A
has an ownership interest, are thereby considered to be the lawyer's client
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAI. CoNDUcr Rule 1.5(a) (1997).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(c) (1997).

108. Rule 5.6(a) provides in pertinent part that "[A] Lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a)
a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement;...." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1997).
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of as itself. This emphasis on Parent, Inc.'s purchase of professional loyalty
suggests that the initial retainer agreement could be a type of "loyalty insurance." 1°9

In balancing Lawyer's and Client X's rights to enter into a professional
relationship in the future against Parent, Inc.'s right to purchase loyalty insurance,

Parent, Inc.'s right should prevail ." ° First, the agreement is not a restriction on
Lawyer's right to practice after termination of the Parent, Inc.-Lawyer retainer
agreement. One reason why Rule 5.6(a) limits Lawyer's right to enter into
restrictive agreements is that after termination of a professional relationship,
Lawyer's ex-client has no substantial interests beyond its concern with
confidentiality. Since confidentiality can be protected in other ways, it is sensible
not to allow ex-clients to restrict Lawyer's right to future practice opportunities.
Second, during a professional relationship, Lawyer must be loyal to her client.
Although this Article argues that for purposes of Rule 1.7(a) this notion of loyalty
is a narrow and instrumental one, it is of sufficient importance to support Parent,
Inc.'s right to take steps to assure that Lawyer does not bring a lawsuit against

members of its corporate family.
This loyalty insurance imposes obvious costs on Lawyer and his potential
Client X. If Lawyer agrees that Subsidiary A, Inc. will be her client for purposes of
Rule 1.7(a), then he will be precluded from representing Client X in the future and
Client X may lose its choice of a lawyer. Given this cost, Lawyer is certain to
demand a fee premium from Parent, Inc. If this is made explicit, then Parent, Inc.

109. Professor Schneyer suggested the term loyalty insurance. See Schneyer, supra note 9 (suggesting that
concepts such as agreement, consent, and waiver can be understood in insurance terms).
110. In SWS FinancialFundA v. Salomon Brothers, Inc., 790 F Supp. 1392, 1402-03 (N.D.III. 1992), the
court said:
Were this court to rule that disqualification was mandated by Schiff's breach of Rule 1.7 in this
case, the implications would be overwhelming. Clients of enormous size and wealth, and with a large
demand for legal services, should not be encouraged to parcel their business among dozens of the best
law firms as a means of purposefully creating the potential for conflicts. With simply a minor
"investment" of some token business, such clients would in effect be buying an insurance policy against
that law firm's adverse representation. Although lawyers should not be encouraged to sue their own
clients (hence the sanctions discussed above), the law should not give large companies the incentive to
manufacture the potential for conflicts by awarding disqualification automatically.
The foregoing discussion should not be misunderstood to mean that this court does not take very
seriously a lawyer's ethical responsibilities to avoid conflicts of interest. Schiff should not have agreed
to bring this suit against Salomon Brothers. Rule 1.7 prohibited it from doing so. The court, however,
does not believe that the costly sanction of disqualification should be automatic for a breach of even so
serious an obligation as that imposed by Rule 1.7. There is no danger in this case that Schiffs advocacy
of Hickey will be less than fully zealous, the trial would not be tainted by Schiffs continued
representation of Hickey, the subject of this litigation is not substantially related to the work Schiff has
done for Salomon, and disqualification would simply not be the appropriate remedy. The court's final
concern is whether Schiff would fail adequately to carry out its commodities futures projects for
Salomon Brothers. Salomon has not mentioned that this might be a possibility and the court sees no
reason to fear that this might be a problem.
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must decide if the insurance is worth the cost. In many cases, Parent, Inc. may
decide to forego the insurance, not to include Subsidiary A, Inc. in the definition of
client for Rule 1.7(a) purposes, and to retain Lawyer regardless, accepting the initial
default position. In other cases, Parent, Inc. may simply choose another attorney to
work on the tax matter. As will be discussed later, this insurance concept will be
helpful in the discussion of conglomerate Parent-A, Inc.'s ability to consent
prospectively to certain conflicts of interest situations.
If an explicit agreement can constitute Subsidiary A, Inc. as a client for
purposes of Rule 1.7(a) then two questions must be addressed. Does Lawyer have
the obligation to raise the issue; and if so, when?"'
Lawyers have an obligation to discover impermissible conflicts of interest, and
they must take appropriate steps, such as internal conflict checks, to avoid them."'
Lawyers are certainly in a better position than a lay client to know if there is a
likelihood that they might not be able to provide effective, independent
representation to the client. Moreover, some small clients may not know that they
have the opportunity to constitute affiliates as Rule 1.7(a) clients. Committee
Dissenter Richard Amster worried about this, stating:
The majority suggests that the parent corporation might avoid this unhappy
situation by arriving at an "understanding" with their lawyers that they
"will avoid representations adverse to the client's corporate affiliates." In
the most elementary terms, what the majority is doing is shifting the
lawyer's burden of protecting the client to the client, who must now protect
itself against its own lawyer. If there is one clear message to be drawn from
the majority opinion, it is that all corporate in-house counsel and all
corporate officers having responsibility for their company's relationship
with their attorneys, should promptly review their retainer agreements and
amend them in order to protect their "corporate affiliates" from their own
13
lawyers.

111. See Sacksteder, supra note 81, at 768-69 (arguing that although Rule 1.7(a) permits a lawyer to proceed
in some cases without his adverse client's consent, Rule 1.4 provides the lawyer with a duty to communicate:
"[B]ecause it is in the client's best interest for the lawyer to disclose the information concerning the potential for
representations against the client's corporate affiliates-information reasonably necessary to enable the client to
make an informed decision about the representation-the lawyer has the duty to communicate to the client").
112. The Comment to Rule 1.7 provides: "The lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for
the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the parties and issues
involved and to determine whether there are actual or potential conflicts of interest." MODEL RULES OF
PRO'ESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7, cmt. [1] (1997).
113. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.

1998/An InstrumentalInterpretationof Model Rule 1.7(a)

To avoid this problem, Lawyer should have a professional obligation to advise
Parent, Inc. at the outset of their lawyer-client relationship that its subsidiaries may

not be Lawyer's clients for purposes of Rule 1.7(a)."1 4 Other sections of the Model
Rules support this early obligation to discuss the matter with the client. Rule 1.4
requires Lawyer to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
Parent, Inc. to make an informed decision regarding the representation.' 5 How

widely to constitute the abstraction of client
for purposes of Rule 1.7(a) is certainly
16
a decision regarding the representation'

114. Although some Committee members may worty that such a position only protects Fortune 500
companies, this is not the case. The lawyer has an obligation to raise these issues with all clients, large and small,
who are, or might be, corporate family members. The lawyer's obligation includes telling the client that
circumstances could change, and there may be new affiliates. See also Sacksteder, supra note 81 (arguing that a
lawyer has a duty to advise clients of such potentially troublesome conflicts).
115. Rule 1.4 states:
Rule 1.4 Communication
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUct Rule 1.4 (1997).
In Illinois State Bar Association, Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct, Opinion 95-15 (1996), the
Committee observed Lawyer has an obligation under Rule 1.4 to inform Client X about his relationship with Parent,
Inc. It said:
In order to proceed in that situation, the lawyer must first reasonably conclude that any potential
limitation will not adversely affect the representation of the potential client and then seek consent of the
affected client after disclosure of the relevant circumstances. In any event, the Committee believes that
Rule 1.4(b) requires a lawyer accepting a representation adverse to a subsidiary or other affiliate of an
existing corporate client to advise the potential new client of the existing client relationship and explain
the consequences of that relationship on the proposed new representation. Where appropriate, the
explanation of consequences should include the possibility that the subsidiary will attempt to disqualify
the lawyer from the contemplated litigation.
Id.
116. In a concurring opinion, Ms. Deborah Coleman makes reference to the importance of Rule 1.4. She
argues, however, that Lawyer had an obligation to discuss the ClientXlawsuit at the time Client Xwished to retain
Lawyer, not originally when Parent, Inc. has retained Lawyer on the tax matter.
A lawyer's unilateral decision to take on a matter adverse to an affiliate of an existing client, made
on the basis of imperfect information about how his client will regard that decision, can easily have
significant ethical repercussions. Rule 1.4 states that "A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." A
lawyer's failure to consult his client about a new representation adverse to its affiliate deprives the client
of the ability freely to make an "informed decision regarding the representation." Instead, the client is
forced to decide between discharging the lawyer, even if such discharge will have a material adverse
effect on its interests (a circumstance in which the lawyer would not have been permitted to withdraw),
or acquiescing in the lawyer's continuing to represent it, with whatever impairment of communication,
cooperation and diligence, and whatever threat to confidentiality, results. It cannot be consistent with
a lawyer's ethical duties for a lawyer to force his client to such a decision.
Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
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An explicit agreement between Parent, Inc. and Lawyer constituting Subsidiary
A, Inc. as a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a) is the surest way of amending the
initial default position. Because Lawyer has the obligation pursuant to Rule 1.4 to
raise this issue of who is the client at the beginning of Parent, Inc. and Lawyer's
professional relationship, it is only a small step to require Lawyer to clarify any
ambiguous situations. Subsidiary A, Inc. or Parent, Inc. may believe it is Lawyer's
Rule 1.7(a) client, and if either manifests this expectation, Lawyer should have the
professional duty to dispel these assumptions. Lawyer's failure to dispel these
expectations should result in Subsidiary A, Inc. becoming a Rule 1.7(a) client. In
this case, there will be an implicit constitutive agreement as to who is the Rule
1.7(a) client. This result is consistent with the general law on the formation of the
lawyer-client relationship. 17
There will necessarily be an agreement with respect to constituting Subsidiary
A, Inc. as a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). It may be explicit; it may be implicit;
it may simply be an acceptance of the initial default position that Subsidiary A, Inc.
will not be constituted a client for these purposes. As has been noted, both Parent,
Inc., Subsidiary A, Inc. and Lawyer will rely on their understanding. Parent, Inc.
may have paid a premium fee for the broad loyalty coverage, and it would be unfair
to it to subsequently allow Lawyer to represent Client X against Subsidiary A, Inc.
Lawyer, too, has relied on her agreement as to whether Subsidiary A, Inc. is a Rule
1.7(a) client. Lawyer may have accepted a low fee for Parent, Inc.'s tax matter in
exchange for her future right to represent Client X against Subsidiary A, Inc. on
unrelated matters.
Because of these expectations, there should be a strong presumption in favor
of keeping the original agreement as to who is a Rule 1.7(a) client.1 Still, if Parent,
Inc. does not include Subsidiary A, Inc. as a Rule 1.7(a) client, there are at least two
situations in which Lawyer will nevertheless lose the opportunity to represent Client
X against Subsidiary A, Inc. in the future. The first situation is where Lawyer learns
relevant information while representing Parent, Inc. on the tax matter. The second
case is where Subsidiary A, Inc. is an alter ego of Parent, Inc.

117. How to determine what are legitimate client expectations is difficult. Not infrequently, the sharing of
confidences indicates the expectations. The sharing of confidences, however, is of particular importance, and it will
also be treated separately. See generally Note, An ExpectationsApproachto ClientIdentity, 106 HARv. L. REv. 687

(1993).
118. Professor Rotunda believes the initial default position is a strong one, and he believes persons should
be reluctant to change it. Rotunda, supranote 9, at 673-75.
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D. The Relevance of Client Information
The Model Rules give particular prominence to the principle of confidentiality.
Rules 1.6 and 1.8(b) mandate Lawyer not to reveal or misuse information relating

to the representation."9 Moreover, this broad protection of client information, even
those of quasi-clients, is consistent with other areas of legal ethics. A person, for
example, may interview a lawyer to discuss possible representation. Although the
person may not retain the lawyer to represent him, information revealed during the
interview will be protected as if the person were a client.'" The person becomes a
client for the purposes of Rule 1.6, 1.8(b), and Rule 1.9(c), prohibiting a lawyer
from using information to the disadvantage of a former client.11 Furthermore, Rule
1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing one client against a former client on the
same or a substantially related matter.' 2 The courts have consistently defined
"substantially related" cases as those in which it is likely the lawyer would have
acquired relevant information while working for the former client. At least one
jurisdiction, Alaska, has borrowed the former client language and has used it in its
simultaneous conflict of interest rule.' 3
Thus, there is a tension between Lawyer's interest in a firm agreement as to
who constitutes his client, and Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc.'s interests in
confidentiality. One fair way to resolve this problem is to constitute Subsidiary A,
Inc. as a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a) whenever Lawyer has acquired relevant

119. Some commentators even believe that this element of confidentiality is the only situation in which a
corporate affiliate is constituted a client. Professor Morgan believes this is too narrow a category. See Morgan,
supranote 9, at 1163 (positing that the "substantial relation" test functions only to protect client confidentiality,
and not other conflict issues).
120. For an explanation of the complexities of determining client identity in the case of corporate entities,
see Hricic,supranote 81, at 722-28.
121. See RFSTATEMENT(THIRD)OPTHELAWGOVERNINGLAWYERS § 27 (Proposed Final Draft No.1, 1996);
SuBCoMMTEE ON ATTORNEY-CLNT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT, ABA SEC. LmrIG., THE LE3AL BEAUTY
CON'EST: RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR PRELIMINARY INTERVIEWS BErWEEN ATTORNEYS

AND PROSPECnV CLIN (1996).
122. Rule 1.9(a) provides:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after
consultation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1997).
123. In July 1993, Alaska adopted its version of Rule 1.7(a) which states:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client in the same or a substantially related matter, unless:
(I) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the
other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
ALASKA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.7 (1998).
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information while working for Parent, Inc., unless Parent, Inc. has explicitly made
clear that Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc. do not object to Lawyer's use of the
information for a future Client X. Although this change in the original agreement
may seem unfair to Lawyer, it is consistent with the overriding importance of the
principle of confidentiality.
If Lawyer wishes to protect himself with respect to future Client X
opportunities, Lawyer must not learn relevant information during his representation
of Parent, Inc. This may not be difficult because Parent, Inc. has retained him to
work on the unrelated tax matter. Lawyer, furthermore, can assure Subsidiary A,
Inc. does not become a client as a result of Lawyer's acquisition of relevant
information by making an explicit agreement with Parent, Inc. that the mere
acquisition of information will not change the initial default position. 124
The ABA Committee concurs on the major point that if Lawyer acquires
information while representing Parent, Inc. relevant to the complex tort matter,
Subsidiary A, Inc. becomes Lawyer's client for Rule 1.7(a). The ABA Committee
said:
A client-lawyer relationship with the affiliate may also arise because the
affiliate imparted confidential information to the lawyer with the
expectation that the lawyer would use it in representing the affiliate....
Additionally, even if the affiliate confiding information does not expect
that the lawyer will be representing the affiliate, there may well be a
reasonable view on the part of the client that the information was imparted
in furtherance of the representation, creating an ethically binding obligation
that the lawyer will not use the information against the interests of any
member of the corporate family.125
E. The Relevance of The Alter Ego Concept
Regardless of the fact that Parent, Inc. may have accepted the original default
position, Subsidiary A, Inc. should nevertheless be constituted Lawyer's client for
purposes of Rule 1.7(a) if Subsidiary A, Inc. is the alter ego of Parent, Inc. What are

124. As will be discussed more fully, the ABA Committee has endorsed, in a guarded way, Parent, Inc.'s

ability prospectively to consent to the use of relevant information, even to its disadvantage. Formal Opinion 93-372,
supra note 5. With respect to the issue of waiving the principle of confidentiality, the Committee was adamant in
insisting that no waiver of a conflict of interest necessarily includes a waiver of the confidential treatment of
information. Id. If a client were to consent to the use of information, it would have to be explicitly and separately
done. For a series of opinions promulgating that any waiver of confidentiality had to be clear, see State Bar of
California, Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Fornal Opinion 1989-113; Committee on
Professional Ethics, The New York County Lawyers Association, Opinion 684 (1992); Illinois State Bar
Association,Advisory Opinion on ProfessionalConduct, Op. 95-15 (1996).
125. Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6.
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the elements of alter ego? Although the concept is used in other areas of law, such

as when to pierce the corporate veil for tort liability, it would be an error to borrow

indiscriminately from other doctrinal areas."t2 Each area has its own set of

problems, and alter ego analysis should differ for different purposes. In the conflicts
of interest area, it is best to relate the meaning of alter ego to a principal purpose of
the conflicts of interest rules, providing a client with effective, independent
representation. As the Official Comment to Rule 1.7 indicates, this translates, in
part, to the idea that Lawyer ought to be loyal to her client.127 If Lawyer's loyalty
to Parent, Inc. will bejeopardized by Client X's lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc.,
then it will be appropriate to deem Subsidiary A,Inc. Lawyer's client for purposes
of Rule 1.7(a).
1. The Meaning of Client Loyalty
But what does it mean to impinge on client loyalty? 28 The concept of loyalty

is a protean one. It has at least three aspects. At its most general, it relates to a
client's entire interest; this is the concept of general loyalty. At the more particular,

126. At least one case disagrees with this view, and borrows indiscriminately from other areas of law. In
Brooklyn Navy Yard CogenerationPartners,LP. v. SuperiorCourt(ParsonsCorp.), 60 Cal. App. 4th 248, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 419 (1997), Lawyer represented BNYCP against the Parsons Corporation, while simultaneously
representing several Parsons' subsidiaries on unrelated matters. Id. at251-52, 7OCal. Rptr. 2d at421. The trial court
determined there was a unity of interest between Parsons and its subsidiaries and therefore Parsons was its client
for purposes of conflict of interests analysis. Id. at 252, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 421. The Court of Appeals reversed. It
stated the unity of interest test was too vague. The true test was the alter ego test that had a more precise and
definite meaning. Id. at 257, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425. The court wrote:
By contrast, the unity of interests exception adopted by the court here has no specific definition
or content. All that is clear from the trial court's application of this exception is that it entails a lesser
showing than that required for a finding of alter ego. Plucked from its usual place within the alter ego
test, the unity of interest concept stands shorn of its accepted meaning and limitations. Vagueness is not
the only problem. The unity of interests concept is potentially so broad that an exception based on it
could easily subsume the rule. After all, every subsidiary shares some unity of interest with its parent.
Rather than a unity of interests exception, we conclude the alter ego exception is the test the court
should have applied for the conflict alleged here. Because the scope of this exception is readily defined
by existing case law, it has the important virtue of specificity. Particularly in matters of ethics, where
gray areas abound, attorneys need clear rules to guide them. Moreover, an alter ego exception is
consistent with the principles applied in the various steps of our analysis above. For example, given the
illusory distinction between alter egos, if one such entity is an attorney's client, its alter ego shares the
client's expectation of loyalty from the attorney. Likewise, economic losses suffered by one alter ego
will be the other's direct losses as well.
Id. at 258, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425.
127. MODEL RULES OFPROEESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [1] (1997).
128. Professor Lawry intelligently discusses the importance ofthis subjective feeling ofloyalty. Lawry.supra
note 9. He criticizes placing too much emphasis on the feeling. This article, on the other hand, emphasizes that
personal feelings are important in that they directly relate to the issue of effective representation.
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it refers to the client's interest as it relates to the particular matter for which the
lawyer was retained. This more particularized loyalty is professional task loyalty.
Finally, there is an instrumental concept of loyalty. This instrumental concept
begins with the idea that the purpose of the conflicts of interest rule is to assure
effective, independent representation with respect to a particular task. It recognizes
that not infrequently Lawyer will have to work in a cooperative team with Parent,
Inc. employees to provide effective service. For the cooperative team to work
effectively together, there must be human-to-human trust. Without this trust, there
may be a disharmonious relationship and the work may not get done effectively.
This instrumental idea focuses on how, and under what conditions, Lawyer's other
commitments will materially impinge on this needed human trust. Lawyer's
representation of Client X in the complex tort lawsuit is only likely to impinge on
this human-to-human trust within the group working on Parent, Inc.'s tax matter if
those persons who are in fact responsible for representing Subsidiary A, Inc. on the
complex tort matter are also personally working with Lawyer on Parent Inc.'s tax
matter.
The first aspect of loyalty is the most general. If this were the standard, it would
prohibit a lawyer from engaging in any activities that might damage any of her
client's interests.' 29 This standard is too broad. It would prohibit law reform, the
representation of competitive clients, and even public positions independent of the
client's own view of what is best for it. In a sense, this concept of loyalty
incorporates the idea that any damage to Subsidiary A, Inc. resulting in financial
loss to Parent, Inc. supports a conclusion of Lawyer's disloyalty to the broad
general interests of Parent, Inc. This Article discusses the weakness of this
position
'
more fully in the section examining the meaning of "direct adversity.'
A second meaning of loyalty focuses on the effective, independent
representation of a Lawyer on a particular task, such as the tax matter. The general
idea is that the lawyer focuses his loyalty on the task for the client, not on the
client's total interests. As has been noted, it is difficult to imagine how Lawyer's
ability to do tax work for Parent, Inc. will be influenced, "without more," by her
obligation to Client Xin its lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. Nothing in Client X's
lawsuit will affect the quality of Lawyer's work on the tax matter. In this situation,
most commentators fear that if there is any professional risk, it is to Client X. If
Parent, Inc. is an important enough client, Lawyer may soft peddle Client X's

129. Rule 6.4 of the Model Rules, by contrast, aggressively encourages lawyers to engage in law reform
activity "notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.4 (1997).
130. Infra Part IV.
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lawsuit in order to curry favor32with Parent, Inc.'3 t This issue, of course, has been
examined under Rule 1.7(b).1
It is the "without more" that suggests instrumental loyalty, the general
psychological feeling of human-to-human trust that generates personal harmony
necessary for a working group to do a job effectively. Committee Dissenter
Coleman worried that the majority's opinion would interfere with the lawyer's
ethical duties in that it might impair Lawyer's "communication, cooperation and
diligence" with respect to her professional task. 3 3 In performing the legal work on
the tax matter, Lawyer may have to cooperate harmoniously with corporate family
personnel. There must, therefore, be a minimal level of human-to-human trust
among the team players. If some members of the team believe that one of its
members has brought a lawsuit against them, they are unlikely to trust that member.
Client X's lawsuit, of course, is not against humans, it is against Subsidiary A, Inc.
But, those persons responsible for representing Subsidiary A, Inc. may feel
personally attacked. They may believe "My own lawyer is suing me."'134 If these
same persons in fact work with Lawyer on the tax matter, then the lawsuit is likely
to cause a diminution in trust and workplace harmony that may impact Lawyer's

131. See Note, Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.

1244, 1298-99 (1981) (suggesting that "the lawyer, on his own initiative, may represent [Client X] less
vigorously").
132. Infra Part IV.B.

133. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
134. In SWS Financial FundA v. Salomon Brothers, Inc., 790 E Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill.
1992), the court found
a violation of the ethics rules, but it denied disqualification. One reason it denied disqualification was that there was
no breach of loyalty, understood in the instrumental sense. No person would "feel" that his lawyer had turned on
him, and there would be no disharmony on the unrelated case. The court stated:
The court must also inquire into whether Salomon's expectations of loyalty were so cavalierly
trampled that disqualification is warranted as a sanction. In this case, Salomon's General Counsel,
Robert Denham (appointed to his position on August 25, 1991) was completely unaware until January
9, 1992 that Schiff had ever provided any legal services to Salomon Brothers. This case is at the polar
extreme from the case in which an individual has a personal relationship with a particular attorney who
provides for all or substantially all of that client's legal needs. In such a case, were the attorney to "turn
on" his client and sue him, disqualification would be appropriate. Materials filed under seal reflect that
Salomon Brothers has engaged a number of other outside legal counsel, apart from Schiff, some of
whom were retained to do financial futures work.
Id. at 1402.
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capacity to do the tax work. 35 In this situation, Subsidiary A, Inc. should be deemed
Parent, Inc.'s alter ego and a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a).136
A small difference in the language of the operational section Rule 1.7(b) and
the categorical section Rule 1.7(a) supports this emphasis on the necessary harmony

among real humans, and how disharmony may result in ineffective counsel. Both
sections of Rule 1.7 allow clients to consent to some prima facie ethics violations.

In the Rule 1.7(b) situation, the lawyer must first "reasonably believe[] the
representation [of the affected client] will not be adversely affected.

' 37

In Rule

1.7(a), the lawyer must reasonably believe the representation of Client X will not
adversely affect the "relationship" with Parent, Inc. Why does Rule 1.7(a) focus on
a relationship rather than the representation? The term relationship connotes a

human-to-human involvement. One suggestion is that Lawyer's ability to provide
Parent, Inc. with effective, independent representation will be influenced, perhaps

substantially, by the human-to-human relationship he has with Parent, Inc.'s
employees. If, as a result of Lawyer's representation of Client X in the lawsuit
against Subsidiary A, Inc., the human employees who are responsible for defending
the lawsuit are the same people who make up Lawyer's work team on the tax
matter, then there may
be sufficient disharmony to impair effective completion of
1 38
task.
matter
tax
the

135. In The Vanderveer Group, Inc. v. Petruny, No. CIV.A. 93-3677, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11131 (E.D.
Pa. July 21, 1993), the law firm represented the plaintiff against Parent, Inc. The firm also represented Independent,
Inc. on an unrelated matter. Parent, Inc. acquired 51% of Independent, Inc., making it Subsidiary A, Inc. The law
firm continued to represent plaintiff against both Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc. on the unrelated matter. Id. at
*1, 2. The court concluded that even though the defendant and its subsidiary had the same house counsel, there was
no showing of active supervision. Id. at * 11, 12. Therefore, the defendant was not per se the client of the law firm
for the purpose of direct adversity. Id. at *9, 10. The court stated:
In effect, we would be concluding that acquisition of a subsidiary corporation automatically extends the
latter's lawyer-client relationships to the purchasing corporation. Stated another way, such a decision
would extend an attorney's duty of loyalty to all other entities then related, or which later become
related, to a corporate client.
Id.at 1402.
In Teradyne v. Hewlett-PackardCo., No. C-91-0344MHPENE, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8363 (N.D. Cal. June
6,1991), the F&R Firm represented Teradyne against Hewlett-Packard in a patent infringement case. Id. at *1,2.
It also represented a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hewlett-Packard on an unrelated matter. Differentlawyers in F&R
worked on the two matters.
The court disqualified F&R from representing Teradyne. Id. at *13, 14. Although the fact that F&R
represented a subsidiary was not, in and of itself, grounds for finding Hewlett-Packard a client (and the court relied
on California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113
(1989)), the fact that Hewlett-Packard's legal counsel carefully supervised the work did constitute sufficient
connection so that Hewlett-Packard was considered a client. Id. at *12.
136. Supra Part I.B.
137. MODEL RULES oFPRoFEssioNAL CoNtucr Rule 1.7(b)(1) (1997).
138. Committee on Professional Ethics, The New York County Lawyers Association, Opinion 684 (1991)
concluded an attorney may bring an action on behalf of one client against a subsidiary of another client. It decided
the issue under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Although it used the "appearance of impropriety"
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The important early case of Grievance Committee v. Rottner,t

9

cited in a

footnote to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility's Ethical Consideration
5-1, makes this point. t4° In Rotner, Stewart Twibble retained the Lessner law firm
to assist him with a default collection action. The law firm did minimal work on his
behalf. When Thomas O'Brien sought the law finn's assistance in an assault and
battery lawsuit against Twibble, the firm readily agreed. It perceived no conflict of
interest. The court held the lawyers in violation of the conflict of interest rules. Its
emphasis was on the personal feelings of the firm's current client, Twibble. The
court stated:
When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of business,
he is entitled to feel that, until the business is finally disposed of in some
manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his
advocate and his champion. If, as in this case, he is sued and his home
attached by his own attorney, who is representing him in another matter, all
feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the profession is exposed to
the charge that it is interested only in money. t4
Although the hypothetical illustration assumes a current client conflict, the
leading case distinguishing a current from a former client is instructive with respect
to this issue of trust between human agents of fictitious entities. The question of
whether Subsidiary A,Inc. is an alter ego of Parent, Inc. is analogous to the question
of whether a client is a current or a former client. In both cases, courts should look
to the operational purposes of Rule 1.7(a).
If the court in IBM v. Levin' 42 had focused on the operational significance of
Rule 1.7(a), the result in that case would have been different. 43 In this case, the
CBM law firm had represented Levin for several years. In March 1972, CBM, on

rubric, it emphasized the problem as the creation of hostility among human persons. It said:
While the appearance of impropriety is difficult to define, as a general rule, the closer the relationship
between the law firm and the subsidiary and the more material an adverse action to the parent, the
greater the chances that the dual representation proposed will appear improper. Where an action would
materially affect the parent, Canon 9 considerations are likely to be implicated if the proposed
representationwould require the lawyer to take action hostile to persons connected with the parent,
such as discoveryof officers or directors of the parentcorporation.

Md.(emphasis added).
139. 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964).
140. Ronter 203 A.2d. at 84 (holding that it was unethical for a lawyer to represent one client against another
person whom he simultaneously represented on an unrelated matter).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. 579 E2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
143. Levin, 579 F.2d 271. Professor Lawry, for other reasons, is equally critical of this case. Lawry,
supranote 9, at 1109.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 30
behalf of Levin, initiated an antitrust suit against IBM. For several years prior to the
initiation of this lawsuit, a CBM labor law specialist had handled several labor law
matters for IBM under the supervision of IBM's in-house labor lawyer. Although
no CBM lawyer had a "specific assignment from IBM on hand on the day the
antitrust complaint was filed and even though CBM performed services for IBM on
' 5 supported the finding
afee for service basis,"' " the "pattern of repeated retainers" 14
that IBM could legitimately expect CBM to represent it on additional labor law
work. There was, the court concluded, "a continuous relationship."" The court then
analyzed the situation as if it were a Rule 1.7(a) simultaneous conflict of interests
47
problem.1
If the court had focused on CBM's ability to provide effective, independent
representation to IBM in labor matters, it might well have concluded that there was
no reason to suspect its ability to provide effective, independent counsel to IBM on
unrelated labor matters. First, it was most unlikely that anything CBM might have
learned in its IBM labor law work would be useful in the antitrust lawsuit. There
was no risk to IBM confidentiality. 48 Second, there should have been no doubt that
CBM could provide IBM effective, independent professional judgment on any labor
law issues. The only reason to doubt CBM's ability to provide effective
representation is that, arguably, CBM's representation of Levin in the lawsuit
against IBM might result in some IBM employees feeling that their lawyer had sued
them. 149And if these same lawyers worked with CBM on labor matters, there would
be such human-to-human distrust and disharmony among the team that CBM could
not do effective, independent work. In the actual case, the IBM in-house lawyers
who worked on antitrust matters were different persons than the in-house lawyers
who assisted with labor matters. They worked in separate departments and did not
even share information with each other.mse There was, therefore, no possibility that
there would be disruptive disharmony in any CBM labor work for IBM.' 5 1
Ironically, the court was aware that different in-house lawyers worked on antitrust

144. Levin, 579 F.2d at 281.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. Professor Crystal notes that the two sets of lawyers did not communicate with each other, and he
therefore concluded that there was no likely disharmony in the trusting relationship.
In the Levin case, different lawyers and different representatives of IBM were involved in the antitrust
case and the labor work. IBM as an entity has undoubtedly faced the situation of having a law firm

represent it in a matter, only later to be opposed by the firm in another matter. In these cases, the risk
of disharmony seems small.
Crystal, supra note 9, at 297.
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and labor matters and they rarely talked to each other. Rather than using these facts

to conclude IBM was not a current client, the court insisted that it was, and then
complained about how IBM ran its in-house office.' 52 If the court had used an

instrumental interpretation, it would have seized on this important distinction and
not have determined IBM as a current client for Rule 1.7(a) purposes.
Thus, for Lawyer to be instrumentally disloyal, some Parent, Inc. personnel

must "take the lawsuit personally" and they must in fact work cooperatively with
Lawyer on the tax matter.' 53 Corporate employees should only take a lawsuit
emotionally if they are personally responsible for its management. Moreover, even
if some employees feel personally attacked, ifthey do not in fact work with Lawyer,
there is no reason to suspect ineffective disharmony. For example, if Lawyer merely
accepts work assignments from Parent, Inc.'s general counsel, then even the general

counsel's emotional "I have been sued" will not directly interfere with Lawyer's
ability to do effective, independent legal work for Parent, Inc. on the tax matter. The
team effort will not be jeopardized. It will take more than general counsel's remote

supervision to interfere with the Lawyer's effective representation of Parent, Inc.
On the other hand, if Parent Inc.'s general counsel is personally responsible for the

complicated tort matter, and if he personally works with Lawyer on Parent, Inc.'s
tax matter, there may be such personal
disharmony that the two cannot work
14
effectively together on the tax case.'
2. Some Ethics Opinions and Cases
The several ethics committees that have addressed this issue recognize this
human ingredient. All assert that if Parent, Inc. and Subsidiary A, Inc. are alter egos

152. The court stated:
[W]e cannot refrain from expressing our belief that such a situation [where the IBM antitrust lawyers
did not know that IBM's labor lawyers were retaining the CBM law firm] could not have existed for
over five years if the activities of the IBM legal department had been properly coordinated and
controlled.
Levin, 579 F.2d at 282.
In Manoir-ElectroalloysCorp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188 (D.NJ. 1989), the court also emphasized
the loyalty ingredient in determining if Carmelo Iacono was a present client of the law firm Hannoch. In that case,
Hannoch, on behalf of plaintiffs, had named Carmelo Iacono as a third-party defendant. The gravamen of the
complaint was fraud. Although the Hannoch firm had not represented Iacono on any matter for a four year period,
the Hannoch firm had represented Iacono on all his personal matters for many years. He legitimately expected that
the firm would take on his additional work, and if the firm did, there is no doubt that the personal trusting
relationship between him and his lawyers would be jeopardized. After all, the gravamen of the complaint was fraud.
153. Professor Morgan sees the issue as whether a "reasonable client [would] perceive a breach of loyalty,
loyalty being understood as more than mere financial category." Morgan, supranote 9, at 1163,1195. Mr. Redding
worries this could be too easily manipulated. Redding, supranote 9. He emphasizes the importance of the personal
attack. Id.
154. Mr. Redding suggests this emphasis on employee job responsibility can be too easily manipulated, Id.
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of each other, then Subsidiary A, Inc. is a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). There
must be a unity of interest; but the mere fact that Parent, Inc. owns 100% of

Subsidiary A, Inc. does not constitute a unity of interests.'55 What does? All
emphasize the human relationships between persons in the two corporations. The

ABA Committee noted that the two corporations would be alter egos if there was
"amanagement so intertwined that all members of the corporate family effectively

operate as a single entity." 156 The Illinois Committee noted the same thing. It said
the two corporations would be alter egos "where the client corporation and the

subsidiary in question have the same management group."' 57 The California
Committee said that a major factor was "the extent to which each entity has distinct
and independent managements and boards of directors."'5

155. In Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners,LP v. Superior Court (Parsons Corp.), 60 Cal. App.
4th 248, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (1997), the court emphasized that the unity of interests test and the alter ego were not
the same.
156. Formal Opinion 95-390 supra note 6. The opinion further states:
Finally, the relationship of the corporate client to its affiliate may be such that the lawyer is required to
regard the affiliate as his client. This would clearly be true where one corporation is the alter ego of the
other. It is not necessary, however, for one corporation to be the alter ego of the other as a matter of law
in order for both to be considered clients. A disregard of corporate formalities andlor acomplete identity
of managements and boards of directors could call for treating the two corporations as one.
Id.
157. Illinois State Bar Association, Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct, Opinion 95-15 (1996). The
opinion continues:
The Committee notes, as do the ABA and the California Bar, that there may well be particular
circumstances that would require the lawyer to consider a subsidiary or other constituent of a corporate
client to be a client of the lawyer as well. Such instances could include, for example, situations where
the lawyer's work for a corporate parent involves direct contact with its subsidiaries and the receipt of
information concerning the subsidiaries protected by Rule 1.6 or situations where the client corporation
and the subsidiary in question have the same management group. Another situation that would require
the lawyer to treat a corporate affiliate as a client is where one entity could be considered the alter ego
of the other. In these kinds of circumstances, the lawyer would be required to seek the corporate client's
consent, with appropriate disclosure, before accepting a representation adverse to the affiliate.
Id.
158. California State Bar Standing Committee onProfessional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989113 (1989). Formal Opinion 1989-113 further states:
The law, however, does recognize in some instances that the corporate form should be disregarded. The
doctrine of alter ego, which has been established to avoid injustices in permitting entities or individuals
to hide behind the corporate veil, provides helpful principles in determining when affiliated corporations
should be treated as the same entity for conflict purposes. When a corporation is the alter ego of another
entity or has a sufficient unity of interests, they should be treated as the same entity for conflict
purposes. In determining whether there is a sufficient unity of interests to require an attorney to
disregard separate corporate entities for conflict purposes, the attorney should evaluate the separateness
of the entities involved, whether corporate formalities are observed, the extent to which each entity has
distinct and independent managements and board of directors, and whether, for legal purposes, one
entity could be considered the alter ego of the other. In this regard, the committee believes that the
percentage of ownership of stock, while a factor to consider, is by no means itself determinative.
Id. (citation omitted).
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The reason why this human-to-human unity of interest is relevant is if there is
the same management, then it is likely that the Subsidiary A, Inc. employees who
might take Client X's lawsuit personally will be the same people who will work
with Lawyer on Parent, Inc.'s unrelated tax matter. This would cause distrust and
disharmony, probably leading to Lawyer's ineffective handling of the tax matter.
The leading case, PennwaltCorp.v. Plough, Inc.,159 captures the importance of
this operational focus.' 6 In that case, the Philadelphia law firm, Dechert, Price &
Rhodes (a multi-city, multi-national firm, hereinafter "DP&R") represented
Pennwalt in a trademark dispute with Plough in the summer of 1977. In June 1978,
DP&R agreed to represent Scholl in a lawsuit unrelated to the Pennwalt trademark
dispute; this was the Shoe Barn antitrust litigation. In April 1979, Schering-Plough
(which owned 100% of Plough) acquired 100% of Scholl. In May 1979, DP&R did
not know that Plough and Scholl were sister corporations, and it, on behalf of
Pennwalt, filed a lawsuit against Plough (the sister corporation of one of its clients).
Although the court's focus was on Plough's motion to disqualify DP&R from
representing Pennwalt (after DP&R had terminated its Scholl representation several
months earlier), the court suggested that there was no impermissible conflict of
interests in the interim. The court eschewed affixing the label of client to Plough,
and instead focused on the "ultimate objective" of the Canons.1 61 In other words,
Plough would be constituted a DP&R client if such a designation advanced the
operational purposes underlying the conflict of interest rules. It concluded that there
was no realistic possibility that DP&R would have acquired any Plough information
(useful to Pennwalt) as a result of its representation of Scholl. The lawsuits were
unrelated and the few Chicago DP&R62lawyers who represented Scholl had only
communicated with Scholl personnel.
In the future, however, Plough would be constituted a Rule 1.7(a) client. Since
Schering-Plough was administratively revamping its legal offices so that Scholl
lawyers would, in the future, be more closely aligned with Plough lawyers through
the same general counsel's office, there was a substantial chance that the in-house
lawyers who represented Plough might be the same persons who would work with
DP&R on the unrelated Scholl matters. In that case, Scholl and Plough would be
alter egos of each other, and each would be constituted a Rule 1.7(a) client.

159. 85 FR.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980).
160. Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 .R.D. 264 (D. Del. 1980).
161. The court did not go so far as to actually state that a lawyer could bring a lawsuit on behalf of one client
against another client, because it did not find that Plough was DP&R's client. In spite of the court's language, its
direct exploration of the relationships suggest that it might have held this. Id. at 269-73.

162. Id.
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A court case that cites Formal Opinion 95-390 supports these distinctions. 63 In
Reuben H. Donnelley Corp.v. SprintPublishing&Advertising, Inc.,164 the law firm
Jones Day had represented United Telephone in a large legal matter since 1986.65
Sprint owned United Telephone. In 1993, Sprint acquired Telephone Company.
Shortly thereafter, Jones Day represented Reuben in a lawsuit against Telephone
Company. Was Jones Day in violation of Rule 1.7(a) because it now represented
one client (Donnelley) against the sister corporation (the Telephone Company) of
another client (United Telephone) that it represented on an unrelated matter? The
court said no. The two companies were not alter egos of each other in that the
persons who were responsible for representing Telephone Company in its lawsuit
against Donnelley were not the same persons who worked with Jones Day on the
United Telephone matter. The court stated:
From the facts presented, it does not appear that the same lawyers in the
corporate parent's office are actively managing the Telephone Company's
defense of this case and the unrelated United Telephone tax matters. The fact
of active management is crucial because the core policy concern in conflict of
interest law is the protection of client privacy....
When different faces represent the corporations in each litigation, the
firm is less likely to feel any divided loyalty that could affect its
representation. "The concepts of having a 'personal attorney' or a 'general
corporate counsel' are much less meaningful today,'166especially among
sophisticated users of legal services, than in the past.
F

Conclusionon the Meaning of Client

What constitutes a client is difficult to determine. The abstraction of client has
to be applied to fictitious juristic entities. First, this Article has suggested a
plausible initial default position-treat each juristic entity separately. Only Parent,
Inc. is Lawyer's client. Second, in the hypothetical illustration, one must examine
if Parent, Inc. and Lawyer have explicitly or implicitly agreed that Subsidiary A,
Inc. should be constituted a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). If there is no
agreement, then Subsidiary A, Inc. should only be constituted a client if it or Parent,
Inc. has disclosed information to Lawyer relevant to Client X's lawsuit and neither

163. In Apex Oil Co., Inc. Wickland Oil Co., No. CIV.S-94-1499-DFLGGH 1995 WL 293944 (E.D. Cal
1995), the court held that merely because the lawyer reported to the same general counsel did not necessarily imply
that one member of the corporate family was an alter ego of another.
164. No. 95-C-5825, 1996 WL 99902 (N.D. fI1. 1996).
165. Reuben H. Donnelley, 1996 WL at 99902, at *1.
166. Id. at *3 (quoting SWS Fin. Fund A. v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1392, 1402 (N.D. Il.1992).
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has clearly and explicitly consented to its use by Lawyer. Third, if Subsidiary A,
Inc. is the alter ego of Parent, Inc., then it will be a Rule 1.7(a) client. The focus of
the inquiry will be on Lawyer's instrumental loyalty to Parent, Inc. If SubsidiaryA,
Inc.'s personnel who are responsible for defending against Client X's lawsuit feel
they have been betrayed by "their own" lawyer and these same human employees
personally work with Lawyer on Parent, Inc.'s tax matter, there is likely to be
distrust and disharmony in the work team. Lawyer's effectiveness for Parent, Inc.
on the tax matter will likely be jeopardized. Only in these circumstances will
Subsidiary A, Inc. be Parent, Inc.'s alter ego. This instrumental interpretation
severely narrows the reach of Rule 1.7(a).
IV. WHAT Is DmEc'r ADVERSITY?
In the above hypothetical illustration, there is no doubt that Parent, Inc. is
Lawyer's client with respect to the tax matter. Is it possible that Client X's lawsuit
against Subsidiary A, Inc. is directly adverse to Parent, Inc.?167 The California
Committee on Professional Ethics took a traditional approach.' 6 It argued that there
is only "direct" adversity if Lawyer's client is a party to the litigation. This Article
argues that this approach is both too broad and too narrow to resolve the Rule 1.7(a)
issue. The ABA Committee's dissenters thought Client X's lawsuit would be
directly adverse to Parent, Inc.t 69 They took a bottom-line, practical approach to the
problem. 10 If Subsidiary A, Inc. loses its lawsuit, then its 100% owner, Parent, Inc.
would, by necessity, lose money or value also.' This loss was as direct, they
believed, as if the lawsuit had been against Division A of conglomerate Parent-A,
Inc. No one doubted, they asserted, in the latter case there would be direct adversity.
Because, from the business person's perspective, the fact that Parent, Inc. operated

167. See Formal Opinion 95-390 supra note 6 (articulating the issue as whether one of the lawyer's clients
is directly adverse to the other).
168. The Committee stated:
As we have stated in the context of issue conflicts, "Normally the scope of 'adversity' which gives rise
to a conflict is limited to party identification .... [T]he 'interests' usually arise within the context of
the same legal matter." (See State Bar Formal Op. No. 1989-108.) Of the numerous and varied
consequences which a representation of one client may have on other clients, well-established legal
authority interpreting the duty of loyalty limits the scope of ethical inquiry to whether the other affected
clients are parties to the case or transaction in which the attorney is acting.
California State Bar Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113 (1989).
169. Mr. Amster warned that the opinion opened a Pandora's Box of unintended consequences. He said that
he might have trouble "defining a conflict but I know one when I see one." Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
170. There are two approaches to this problem. The Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of Interest
Issues, 50 BUs. LAW. 1381. 1387-89 (1995).
171. In StratagemDevelopment Corp. v. Heron International,756 F Supp. 789, 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the
court found it was clear because the "liabilities of a subsidiary corporation directly affect the bottom-line of the
corporate parent."
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through a subsidiary made no important difference, it logically followed that the
lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. should be as direct as if it had been against
Parent, Inc. This analysis focused only on bottom-line considerations.
Other commentators have focused on the size of Client X's lawsuit to determine
its directness. The more material the action is, the more likely it is to be direct. The
Restatement adopts this position, at least in an illustration. 172 In its comment, it
states:
In some situations, however, the financial or personal relationship between the
lawyer's client and other persons or entities might be such that the lawyer's
obligations to the client will extend to those other persons or entities as well.
That will be true, for example, when financial loss or benefit to173
the non-client
person or entity will have a direct, adverse impact on the client.
There is a certain degree of question-begging in this passage. It includes the fact
that the loss has a "direct, adverse impact" in its proposition, without defining what
is a direct impact. In Illustration 6, it assumes, without analysis, that the materiality
of the loss makes a difference. The Illustration states: "[A]ny judgment obtained
against Corporation B [i.e., Subsidiary A, Inc.] will have a material adverse impact
on the value of Corporation B's assets and thus on the value of the assets of
Corporation A [i.e., Parent, Inc.]" 174 This, the Illustration concludes, disables
Lawyer from representing
Client X without the consent of Parent, Inc., Subsidiary
1 75
A, Inc. and Client X.
This Article considers the materiality of Client X's lawsuit against Subsidiary
A, Inc. irrelevant to the issue of what is "direct adversity." Directness is a
qualitative term. The size of Client X's lawsuit may have operational significance
under Rule 1.7(b) in that the large size of a lawsuit may materially limit Lawyer's
representation in a different way than would a smaller lawsuit. If Lawyer, for

172. RESTATEMENT (TI'RD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 illus. 6 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1,

1996).
173. Id. cmt. d.
174. Id. illus. 6.
175. Committee on Professional Ethics, The New York County Lawyers Association, Opinion 684 (1992)

made a similar assumption. It said:
A lawyer's ethical responsibilities with regard to the parent corporation should be a function of the
materiality of the adverse action. Where an adverse action would materially affect the parent, the
lawyer's ethical duty is the same as it would be were the parent itself the subject of the action. Under
such circumstances, the lawyer should only represent the adverse client if it is obvious that the lawyer
can adequately represent both clients and if each consents. On the other hand, where an action against
a subsidiary would not have a material adverse effect on the parent, the lawyer should be free to
represent the adverse party.
Id. (citation omitted).
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example, wished to gain favor with Parent, Inc., he might be tempted to soft peddle
his advocacy in a large, rather than a small, lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. If this
were the case, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), Lawyer would have to obtain Client X's
informed consent to Lawyer's continued representation of Client X against
Subsidiary A, Inc.
The size of a lawsuit, however, does not change its qualitative nature. Direct
adversity should be understood in light of the purposes of the conflicts of interest
rules-to provide effective, independent [client] representation, with an appropriate
regard for confidentiality and loyalty. What will make an action directly adverse in
a Rule 1.7(a) context is its impact on the lawyer's effectiveness in representing the
client on a particular professional task. The Committee suggests a similar position
by opining that the concept of directness is not a matter of financial loss, large or
small. 76 In determining whether Client X's lawsuit was directly adverse to Parent,
Inc., the Committee relied on two previous opinions: Formal Opinion 92-367177
(Lawyer examining a client as an adverse witness) and Formal Opinion 93-377178
(Positional Conflicts). In these opinions, the Committee had previously held the
former expressed direct adversity, while the latter did not. Why?
In Formal Opinion 93-377, the Committee addressed the question whether "a
lawyer can represent a client with respect to a substantive legal issue when the
lawyer knows that the client's position on that issue is directly contrary to the
position being urged by the lawyer.., on behalf of another client in a different, and
unrelated, pending matter."' 79 The Committee recognized the precedent that might
be created if one case on behalf of one client could easily result in significant

176. The Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts ofInterest Issues, 50 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1387-89
(1995). In illustrations 6 and 7, the Restatement takes this same position. It emphasizes the bottom-line, and the
materiality of the loss. RESTATEmENT rMD)OPTHELAW GOVERN NGLAWYERS § 201, illus. 6-7 (Proposed Final
Draft No.1, 1996).
The California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct also takes a
purposive stance. It is the quality of the conflict, not its size or materiality, that is at stake. California State Bar
Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1989-113 (1989).
Illinois State Bar Association, Advisory Opinion on Professional Conduct, Opinion 95-15 (1996) stated:
The Committee also believes that the choice of the modifier "directly" in Rule 1.7(a) to define adversity
should be interpreted to exclude indirect, derivative and other speculative impacts of the lawyer's
activity from an analysis under the Rule. Otherwise, any conceivable impact on a client, however slight
or implausible, would have to be taken as impermissible, direct adversity. For these reasons, the
Committee agrees with the ABA in its Opinion No. 95-390 that any adverseness in such circumstances
is, as a general matter, indirect rather than direct and therefore not prohibited by Rule 1.7(a). Again,
unique facts or circumstances might suggest a different result in a particular matter, but the general rule
should be that an indirect or speculative impact on an existing client would not render a representation
"directly adverse" under Rule 1.7(a).
177. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-367 (1992).
178. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-377 (1993).
179. Id.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 30
financial consequences to the second client. The adversity, however, was indirect,
and Rule 1.7(a) was inapplicable.1s8 In Formal Opinion 92-367, the Committee
addressed the question of whether a lawyer who has a doctor as a general client may
cross-examine the doctor when the doctor testifies as an adverse expert witness in
a medical malpractice case. 8 t The Committee explained, in passing, that direct
adversity entailed "any advantage gained by the lawyer in representation of the
litigation client [that] necessarily entails some concrete disadvantage to the [other]
client."18 2 It concluded "there will almost inescapably be a direct adverseness, under
Rule 1.7(a)" 183 in this situation. The Committee explained "that at least absent
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer will not adequately examine an opposing
expert witness without endeavoring to challenge the witness's qualifications and
credibility; impugning a client's word or qualifications is directly adverse to that
1 s4
client."
In Formal Opinion 95-390, Dissenter Fox, with his focus on the economic
bottom-line, noted Client X's lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc. threatened Parent,
Inc.'s bottom-line more than Lawyer's cross-examination ofthe doctor witness. Fox
stated:
If attacking the credibility of a witness, who is not a party, is said to entail
a concrete disadvantage, then suing the subsidiary of a client for damages
surely entails an even greater and more concrete disadvantage. In the
former case, by definition, the witness has no stake in the litigation and so
at worst some feelings get bruised or one's reputation tarnished; but in the
latter the lawyer who is suing the subsidiary of a parent client is literally
putting her hand in her client's pocketbook. Short of physical injury, it does
5
not get more concrete than that.1 &
If it is the economic measure of the loss that distinguishes "direct adversity,"
then Fox is probably correct. Parent, Inc. stands to lose much more than the doctor
in Formal Opinion 92-367. What Fox fails to understand is that if the lawyer in
Formal Opinion 92-367 attacked the qualifications and credibility of his client
doctor, it would be likely that the client doctor would personally resent this attack.
He would feel his own lawyer was challenging him. In such a circumstance, distinct

180. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, Opinion 265 (1996) opined that positional conflicts could raise

conflict of interests issues. The question would be whether a particular client would be adversely affected by the
lawyer's position. It was not an issue of direct adversity.
181. Formal Opinion 92-367, supranote 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
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feelings of human-to-human distrust would create disharmony. It is unlikely client
doctor would be able to work effectively with lawyer on the unrelated, general
matters that are the subject of lawyer's professional task retainer. The Committee's
majority suggests this point when it states that what makes adversity direct is
"specifically the closeness of the connection between the lawyer's actions and the
adverse effect on the client."'t
How can we apply this "closeness of the connection" criteria to the hypothetical

illustration? The best way is to focus on the principal purpose of Rule 1.7(a)-to
assure Lawyer's effectiveness with respect to Parent, Inc.'s tax matter. Because this
was the same way this Article approached the alter ego problem, it is sensible to use

the same interpretive approach-the instrumental one. In effect, the criteria for
"direct adversity" becomes the same as the standard for alter ego. It is plausible that

the persons directly responsible for the complex tort lawsuit will feel personally
attacked by Client X's lawyer. They may well feel like the doctor in Formal Opinion

92-367. They will personally distrust Lawyer. If these same persons personally
work with Lawyer on Parent, Inc.'s tax matter, there is likely to be disharmony in

the work team that may well result in ineffective legal service. This tie between the
feeling, the human-to-human distrust and disharmony, and Lawyer's effectiveness

provides the quality of "closeness of the connection" that changes an adverse
impact on Parent, Inc. into a directly adverse impact. t7

186. Id.
187. The relationship suggested here may be illustrated by one of Dissenter Fox's partial quotes. He states:
The final ironic infirmity in the majority opinion is its recognition that the lawyer might run afoul of
Model Rule 1.7(b)'s material limitation language because the client [Parent-A, Inc.] might resent the
lawyer's undertaking any representation that threatened, even indirectly, any adverse effect on ...the
financial well-being... of the corporate client.
Id.
This partial quote suggests that the majority believed mere financial loss to Parent, Inc. might be a per se
material limitation on Lawyer's representation of Parent, Inc. The majority's full quote, however, suggests it was
not concerned with Parent, Inc. but rather With Lawyer's obligations to Client X. As has been noted, if Parent, Inc.
stands to lose a great deal, Lawyer may be tempted to relax his advocacy and diligence on behalf of Client X. The
full quote reads:
Thus, Rule 1.7(b) might come into play if the lawyer had reason to believe that, even though there was
no understanding as to how the corporate client's affiliates were to be treated, nonetheless the corporate
client would resent the lawyer's undertaking any representation that threatened, even indirectly, any
adverse effect on either the financial well-being or the programmatic purposes of the corporate client;
and if, because of this belief, there was a significant risk that the lawyer's diligence or judgment on
behalf of his new client would be adversely affected by his awareness of the corporate client's
displeasure.
Id.
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Finally, there are a set of practical problems that caution against holding Client
X's lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc., directly adverse to Parent, Inc. 88 Regardless
of what a lawyer does for a client, there will often be a series of indirect
consequences to other persons. If a lawyer represents two business competitors,
assisting one will injure the other. But, the Official Comment to Rule 1.7 notes
18 9
competition among competitors does not raise a "directly adverse" problem.
Moreover, with respect to the economic diminution of value of an owners interest
in a litigant, it would be very difficult to determine when a small ownership interest
becomes so significant that it will be deemed direct adversity.' 9° Indeed, in a large
corporation, it will be virtually impossible to tell who owns the corporation, and
how significant are their interests.!9 ' For these reasons, the mere fact of economic
interest should not be the defining element of "direct" adversity.
V.How TO DECONSTITTE A RULE 1.7(A) CLIENT BY CONSENT, WAIVER AND
PROSPECTIVE CONSENT

If there has been a prima facie violation of either the operational Rule 1.7(b) or
the categorical Rule 1.7(a), under appropriate circumstances the client can consent
to the continued representation. The Rule 1.7(b) approach is straightforward. The
lawyer must determine if he reasonably believes he can effectively represent each
client, and then each affected client must consent to the continued representation. 92
Rule 1.7(a) is more complicated. As has been noted, if Lawyer's actions fall
within the bright-line categories of the rule, both clients must consent to Lawyer's
continued representation of either client.' 93 It is not relevant that one client may not
be materially affected by the representation of the other. Why this should be the
case is unclear. The most plausible explanation is, in a typical situation in which
Lawyer is representing adversarial clients in the same lawsuit,each affected client

188. California State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Opinion

1989-113 states:
If such indirect adverse consequences were prevented by the duty of loyalty, attorneys would be
conflicted out of representations where the indirect adverse impact was slight and unpredictable.
Moreover, there would be no way to construct any meaningful standard to distinguish among indirect
consequences. We can determine no principled basis to distinguish the facts presented here from the
situation where an attorney brings suit against a publicly-held corporation in which numerous of his or
her clients may own relatively small amounts of stock. The indirect impact on the non-party client
shareholders would certainly not give rise to that kind of adversity which would create a conflict of
interest.
189. MODEL RuLES OF PRoFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. [3] (1997).
190. Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court (Parsons Corp.), 60 Cal. App. 4th
248, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (1997).
191. Id.
192. Rule 17(b), supranote 2.
193. Rule 1.7(a), supranote 2.
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would have to consent to representation under Rule 1.7(b). Because the drafters of
Rule 1.7(a) might have had this case in mind, they may have simply rushed to the
judgment that both clients must always consent to the representation. 9"4
However, Rule 1.7(a)'s veto provision is unrelated to Lawyer's effective,
independent representation of each client. One escape from the interpretive
difficulty between 1.7(a) and 1.7(b) is to encourage carefully drafted engagement
letters. This Article suggests that conglomerate Parent-A, Inc. in the hypothetical
illustration should be able to deconstitute itself as a Rule 1.7(a) client by waiver or
prospective consent.
Earlier this Article argued that Parent, Inc. could constitute Subsidiary A, Inc.
as a Rule 1.7(a) client by explicit agreement with Lawyer."' The initial default
position, that Lawyer only represented Parent, Inc., was changed by explicit
agreement. Parent, Inc. purchased loyalty insurance. Here, the initial default
position should again be that Lawyer represents the single juristic entity, the
corporate conglomerate, Parent-A, Inc., but this too can be changed by explicit
agreement between Parent-A, Inc. and Lawyer. In other words, Parent-A, Inc. can
agree to Lawyer's representation of Client X against it in a complex tort matter,
regardless of the fact that Lawyer may simultaneously represent Parent-A, Inc. on
the unrelated tax matter.
Although all commentators agree that Parent-A, Inc. may consent, after full
consultation, to some conflicts of interest, there is disagreement with respect to
whether it can do this prospectively. Describing Parent-A, Inc.'s consent to a Rule
1.7(a) conflict as the act of deconstituting itself as a Rule 1.7(a) client-analogous
to the agreement between Parent, Inc. and Lawyer to constitute Subsidiary A, Inc.
as a Rule 1.7(a) client-should make courts and commentators more sympathetic
to the validity of prospective waivers. It suggests Parent-A, Inc.'s consent may
occur when Parent-A, Inc. first retains Lawyer-in other words, prospectively. This
way of describing waiver also suggests Parent-A, Inc. and Lawyer should have
broad latitude to deconstitute Parent-A, Inc. for Rule 1.7 purposes. In this process
of deconstituing itself, the conglomerate Parent-A, Inc. is granting waivers or
exceptions to the loyalty insurance it, ipso facto, acquired with the initial default
position.

194. Rule 1.7(a) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct limits impermissible conflicts of interests to

"same matter" conflicts. D.C. CODE ANN. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.7 (1998). Moreover, the D.C. Rule 1.7(b)
permits otherwise impermissible conflicts if "(I) each potentially affected client provides consent to such
representation after full disclosure of the existence and nature of the possible conflict and the possible adverse
consequences of such representation; and (2) the lawyer is able to comply with all other applicable rules with

respect to such representation." l.
195. Supra Part III.C.
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A permissive policy with respect to these waivers may serve the interests of
both Parent-A, Inc., Client X, and Lawyer. Without such a prospective consent,
Lawyer may be reluctant to work for Parent-A, Inc. on a limited tax matter. Lawyer
may fear it will preclude too much future work. Parent-A, Inc. may be equally
disadvantaged. It may believe that Lawyer is the best tax lawyer in the country, and
it may be willing to reshape the conglomerate default rule to deconstitute itself as
a client for purposes of Rule 1.7(a). As the ABA Committee wrote:
Indeed, the seeking of waivers against future conflicts of interest may well
represent a total concordance of the present interests of attorney and client.
At the moment of the engagement each is perfectly willing to go forward
with the representation on a basis that secures to the client her choice of
counsel and at the same time protects the lawyer from challenge by the
client to future representations whose nature and scope is yet not identified
which the lawyer worries that the client might find objectionable at a later,
perhaps more emotion-laden, time.'9
There should be the same limitations on the granting of waivers as there were
on the purchase of this type of loyalty insurance. First, if Lawyer, while working for
Parent-A, Inc., acquires information relevant to Client X's lawsuit, there should be
no permissible consent without the most explicit agreement that such information
can be used by Lawyer on behalf of Client X. Second, there should be no
permissible consent to Lawyer's representation of Client X if this representation
will jeopardize Lawyer's professional work on the tax matter for Parent-A, Inc. As
with the alter ego analysis, this is most likely to occur if the people responsible for
managing Parent-A, Inc.'s complex tort matter against Client X also personally
work with Lawyer on the unrelated tax matter.
Normally, the legal literature discusses what this Article has called a
deconstituting agreement as the issue of prospective waiver.9' Although it has been
argued that the agreement of Parent-A, Inc. and Lawyer deconstituting Parent-A,
Inc. as a Rule 1.7(a) client should be as easily arranged as the agreement of Parent,
Inc. and Lawyer constituting Subsidiary A, Inc. as a Rule 1.7(a) client, the law is not
so clear.

196. Formal Opinion 93-372, supra note 5.
197. E.g., Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, When Waiver Should Not Be Good Enough: An Analysis of
Current Conflict Law, 33 WLAMEtnE L. REV. 145 (1997); Task Force on Conflicts of Interest, Conflicts of
InterestIssues, 50 Bus. LAW. 1381 (1995); Note, United Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., The Client'sRight to
Consent to Potential Conflicts of Interest, 11 CAP. U. L. REV. 625 (1982); Comment, Dual Representation in
UnrelatedMatters Permittedwith ClientConsentwhen Firm Can ProtectClients' Best Interests, Unified Sewerage
Agency v. Jelco Inc., 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 1155 (1982).
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As noted above, Model Rule 1.7(a) permits Parent-A, Inc. to consent to a prima
facie ethics violation after full consultation."' The Committee, in Formal Opinion
93-372, took a guarded view with respect to the enforceability of prospective
consents to prima facie violations of Rule 1.7(a).'" First, it concluded there must
be "no adverse effect on the first representation from undertaking the second
representation," and this judgment must be made both at the time of the prospective
consent and it must be "revisited" at the time of the subsequent representation. °°
Second, it noted "the particular future conflict of interest as to which the waiver is
invoked [be] reasonably contemplated at the time the waiver was given. 2 °1 The
Committee added the rigorous gloss "it would be unlikely that a prospective waiver
which did not identify either the potential opposing party or at least a class of
potentially conflicting clients would survive scrutiny."' Third, it stated any waiver
with respect to confidentiality had to be explicit.
The first requirement of no adverse effect on the first representation and the
"revisiting of this issue" is consistent with this Article's proposed interpretation.
The focus must always be on whether Lawyer can effectively provide Parent-A, Inc.
professional and independent tax advice. If Lawyer is disloyal in the instrumental
sense emphasized here, then there will be an impermissible conflict, regardless of
any prospective consent. The Committee said:
For example, it may be that the [Client X] representation will involve a
challenge to the conduct of the CEO of [Parent-A, Inc.], the very individual
whose integrity is on the line in the [Client X lawsuit]. [Lawyer] cannot
ignore this issue; rather, Rule 1.7 requires [Lawyer] to determine whether
this fact alone creates an adverse effect on [Lawyer's representation of the
Parent-A, Inc.] which precludes reliance on the prospective waiver as a
basis for undertaking the [Client X lawsuit against Parent-A, Inc.]. °3
In this case, what must be determined is whether the CEO, whose personal integrity
is on the line and who will feel that Lawyer is challenging him, also works with
Lawyer on the tax matter. If these are the facts, it is unlikely that there will be
adequate human-to-human trust and harmony to provide Lawyer the work group
necessary to assure effective representation on the tax matter.

198. RESTATEmEN (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYEis § 202 (Proposed Final Draft No.1,1996).
199. Formal Opinion 93-372, supra note 5; RESTATEMENT(HIRD) OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 202
cmt. (d) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996).
200. Formal Opinion 93-372, supra note 5.
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The second requirement, particularly with the Committee's rigorous gloss, is
unreasonable. 2 4 Because Lawyer will be working on Parent-A, Inc.'s tax matter,
Parent-A, Inc. should be able to consent to Lawyer representing any client in any

unrelated matter against it. Lawyer will not know who these future clients will be.2o

Parent-A, Inc. is not injured by prospectively consenting in that it will be assured

of Lawyer's effective work by the "revisit" requirement. This recommended
approach, moreover, is consistent with the broad latitude Parent-A, Inc. and Lawyer
should have in Parent-A, Inc. deconstituting itself as a Rule 1.7(a) client.

The third requirement accurately captures the importance of confidentiality in
this suggested proposal and replicates the problem when the issue was whether

Subsidiary A, Inc. would be constituted a Rule 1.7(a) client. There, it was noted, if
Lawyer learned information relevant to Client X's lawsuit while representing

Parent, Inc., then Subsidiary A,Inc. would be constituted a Rule 1.7(a) client unless
there was an explicit refutation of this result.2' This requirement of explicit
agreement with respect to confidential information assures the important issue of
lawyer confidentiality will not be confused with other issues, and that the client
clearly knows to what it is agreeing. In the same vein, Parent-A, Inc. should be able

to prospectively consent to Lawyer representing some future Client X against it, but
any prospective consent with respect to confidential information should be most

explicit.
Finally, there should always be the opportunity of finely tailored, conditional

prospective consents to meet all interests. 2ol These can go a long way toward
assuring Parent-A, Inc. that Lawyer will remain effective and independent with

respect to the tax matter and Lawyer will not violate important principles of
confidentiality in her representation of Client X. Lawyer may, for example, be a
large decentralized law firm. The Omaha branch may be doing Parent-A, Inc.'s tax
matter. Parent-A, Inc. and Lawyer may prospectively agree that Lawyer's New

204. Professor Crystal distinguishes between a blanket prospective consent and a conditional consent. He
clearly disapproves of the former. Crystal, supra note 9.
205. Redding, supra note 9.
206. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
207. Truck Insurance Exchange v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228
(1992), was a case in which a large law firm argued that it should avoid disqualification because it effectively
screened its personnel. The Crosby Firm represented an affiliate ofFFIC (Fireman's Fund), the credit union, on two
"wrongful termination" cases. Truck, a long-time client of the Crosby firm, asked the Firm to represent it in a large
scale lawsuit. The Crosby Firm sought FFIC's consent, and when that was denied, it "fired" FFIC and proceeded
to represent Truck against it. FFIC moved to disqualify it, and the court granted the motion. The court was insistent
that there not be a different rule for large law firms. It said: "[Tihat the duty of loyalty owed a client of a large law
firm is somehow less than that owed to the client of a smaller firm or sole practitioner, we summarily reject the
implication." id. at 1060, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
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York office, if appropriately screened from its Omaha office, may represent
unknown future clients against Parent-A, Inc. on unrelated matters." 8
VI. A LAWYER MAY SIMULTANEOUSLY REPRESENT ONE CLIENT AGAINST
ANOTHER CLIENT WHOM HE REPRESENTS ON AN UNRELATED MATTER

Might it also be possible, even without Parent-A, Inc.'s consent, for Parent-A,
Inc. to be deconstituted as a client for Rule 1.7(a) purposes? Can one take the
Committee dissenters' logic in Formal Opinion 95-390, turn it on its head, and
discover that a lawyer may represent one client against another simultaneous client
on an unrelated matter?
First, the Committee dissenters believed it clear that Lawyer could not represent
Client Xin the complex tort lawsuit against Parent-A, Inc. whom he simultaneously
represented in the unrelated tax matter.2°9 Second, they also believed that whether
210
a business operated through subsidiaries or divisions was essentially irrelevant.
These two premises led the dissenters to their conclusion that Lawyer could not
represent Client X in lawsuit against Subsidiary A, Inc., while simultaneously
representing Parent, Inc. on an unrelated tax matter.
The dissenters second belief is a strong one. Businesses operate it in a variety
ofjuristic forms, and usually these are irrelevant to actual operating concerns. If we
accept the dissenters' second belief, and combine it with the majority's conclusion
that there was no per se breach of ethics if Lawyer represented Client X against
Subsidiary A, Inc., while simultaneously representing Parent, Inc. on an unrelated
matter, we get the surprising result that Lawyer should not be prohibitedpersefrom
representing Client X against Parent-A, Inc., even though Lawyer may be
simultaneously representing Parent-A, Inc. on an unrelated tax matter. If Client X's
lawsuit engages Division A, then Parent-A, Inc. need not be a Rule 1.7(a) client and
Client X's a lawsuit against Parent-A, Inc. is not necessarily "directly adverse" to
it.
This instrumental interpretation of Rule 1.7(a) will always define "client" or
"directly adverse" with an eye to its impact on Lawyer's professional task for
Parent-A, Inc. Will Lawyer be able to provide effective, independent representation,
with due regard to confidentiality and loyalty, on this professional task. If Lawyer,
while working on the tax matter for Parent-A, Inc, acquires no information related

208. In Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. ArthurAndersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977), the law firm attempted
to set up an ethics wall between its various offices in order to avoid an impermissible conflict of interest. The
proposal here suggests it could have entered into an agreement with its first client to permit an ethics wall to avoid
the conflict.
209. Formal Opinion 95-390, supra note 6.
210. Id.
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to the complex tort matter, there will be no threat to this important value. And, if
the Parent-A, Inc. employees responsible for defending the complex tort lawsuit do
not personally work with lawyer on the tax matter, there is no reason to doubt
Lawyer's effective, independent representation on the tax matter. If both these
conditions are met, then Parent-A, Inc. should be deconstituted as a client for
purposes of Rule 1.7(a)." Client X's lawsuit, moreover, should not be considered
directly adverse to Parent-A, Inc.
This suggestion is surprising. The Committee dissenters could not believe
anyone would take this position. 2 2 It follows, however, from the dissenters' logic,
and it grapples with the complex structure of modern businesses. Rule 1.7(a) uses
the abstract category "client" and the category "directly adverse" to trigger ethics
violations. A wooden application of facts into these categories leads to unfair
results. Still, the instrumental mode of interpretation will surprise many. How can
a lawsuit that names Parent-A, Inc. as a party defendant not be directly adverse to
it? How can a single juristic entity be deconstituted so it is no longer a client for
Rule 1.7(a), while it remains a single juristic entity for many other legal purposes?
Because of this surprise element, this instrumental mode of interpretation
should be pushed to this ultimate logical position with caution. It should only be
applied when a prima facie ethics violation is beyond Lawyer's control. On the one
hand, if a client creates the fact situations or if unforseen facts develop that trigger
Rule 1.7(a) categories, it is unfair to Lawyer to subject him to professional
discipline. On the other hand, if Lawyer, while representing Parent-A, Inc. on the
tax matter, agrees to represent Client X in an unrelated complex tort lawsuit
engaging Division A of Parent-A, Inc., then Lawyer has effectively brought the
problem on himself. Although this line-drawing may seem illogical, it leaves
standing, in many cases, traditional modes of thinking.
SWS FinancialFund A v. Salomon Brothers, 213 supports this analysis. 214 The
multi-city law firm of Schiff, Hardin represented the Hickey Companies in a
conspiracy lawsuit against Salomon Brothers, while it simultaneously represented
Salomon Brothers in an unrelated matter. The court stated Schiff, Hardin violated
Rule 1.7(a), but in holding the firm should not be disqualified from representing the
Hickey Companies against Solomon Brothers, it analyzed the purposes behind Rule
1.7(a) and concluded disqualification was not appropriate.2 5

211.
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It is, of course, still Lawyer's client for other purposes, such as the completion of the tax matter.
Formal Opinion 95-390, supranote 6.
790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill., 1992).
SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros. Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Id. at 1394.
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The court noted there were basically two purposes behind Rule 1.7(a). First, it
was designed to protect client confidences.216 In this case, the court concluded there
was no evidence that anything Schiff, Hardin might have learned would be even
remotely relevant to the Hickey lawsuit. Second, the purpose of Rule 1.7(a) was to
assure loyalty.217 The court concluded there was no chance the particular
participating personnel would lose their trusting relationship with participating
Schiff, Hardin lawyers. The court concluded there was no challenge to the lawyer's
loyalty.218 Although the court did not state it, it could easily have concluded that
Salomon was not Shiff Hardin's client for Rule 1.7(a) purposes.
VII. CONCLUSION

The underlying problem has been the application of the bright-line categorical
Rule 1.7(a) to the abstract category client in the fictional corporate and corporate
family situations. The wooden application of the Rule leads to inconvenient and
sometimes absurd results. This Article has suggested an instrumental interpretation
that emphasizes the operational purposes of the conflicts of interest provisions in
the Model Rules. One consequence of this analysis has been to peek into Pandora's
box and to suggest it might be permissible for a lawyer to represent one client in a
lawsuit against another simultaneous client whom the lawyer represents on an
unrelated matter, certainly with the second client's consent, and, in appropriate
cases, without its consent. Although this discussion focused on the corporate family
problem and relied on ABA Formal Opinion 95-390, it strongly suggests Rule
1.7(a) should simply be deleted from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
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